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ABSTRACT
Risk Analysis in Biometric-Based Border Inspection System
Mayra A. Sacanamboy
The main goal of a Border Inspection System is to prevent the entry of individuals who
pose a threat to a country. The entry of just one of these persons could have severe
consequences. Nevertheless, performing a lengthy border inspection is not possible,
given that 240,737 international passengers enter the country in an average day [5]. For
this reason, the primary inspection is performed using biometrics traits and information
flow processes that have a low false acceptance rate and have a high throughput.
This thesis uses the analytic modeling tool called LQNS (Layered Queueing Network
Solver) to solve open models for biometric-based border inspection system and cost
curves to evaluate the risk. The contributions of the thesis include a performance model
of a biometric-based border inspection using open workloads and a risk model of a
biometric-based border inspection using cost curves. Further, we propose an original
methodology for analyzing a combination of performance risk and security risk in the
border inspection system.
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Chapter 1 : Introduction

An increasing number of computer systems strives to maximize performance or to
minimize cost for a given functionality without reducing the functional requirements or
including new system components. To achieve this goal, risk assessment in the early
design phase of software lifecycle followed by performance analysis in all phases in the
lifecycle guides the selection of the most prominent design among design alternatives,
avoiding the implementation of unacceptable designs.
Information generated by a critical system cannot be trusted given the possible
existence of software faults. Failures may result in either the loss of life, injury or
damage to the environment, high economic losses or failure of a goal-directed activity.
Mission-critical system, such as a border inspection system for example, has to quantify
the uncertainty whether a traveler represents a treat to the country he wants to enter in.
An inspector makes his final decision based on the output given by the biometric and
database search modules, and his expertise.
This chapter presents an introduction to software performance and software
performance engineering. The section that follows summarizes our contributions to
modeling techniques used to solve performance and risk models of biometric-based
border inspection systems. This chapter concludes with the thesis outline.

1.1

Software Performance
Performance is a “pervasive quality of software systems” which means that the

software components and the underlying layers like hardware, middleware, operating
system, among others, exert their influences on it [26].

The most frequently used

techniques for evaluating system performance are measurement, simulation and analytic
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modeling.

Measurement relies on the existence of a live system while simulation and

analytic modeling depend on a model of the system under consideration [20].
Among these techniques, the costliest one is measurement, since it is feasible only if
there exists a real system with the configuration being studied. Nevertheless, the
measurement technique gives the most accurate results, because parameters, such as
workload, are representative. Simulation uses the model of the system under study by
creating a program which traces the progress of events as discrete steps over time.
Analytic modeling applies mathematical expressions to obtain performance results
for the system being studied. This kind of modeling requires simplifying assumptions,
which allow analyzing large systems. It is computationally efficient and its parameters
are easier to obtain due to their higher level of abstraction. Accuracy is one advantage
that simulation has over analytic modeling, nevertheless simulation models are often time
consuming and difficult to design, debug, parameterize and execute.

1.2

Software Performance Engineering
Software performance engineering (SPE) is a methodology that has been

successfully incorporated into software development [23]. SPE uses quantitative methods
to identify architectural and design alternatives that will fulfill performance objectives.
Furthermore, SPE allows to improve the design through a better understanding of the
performance properties within the system.
Performance issues that can be easily addressed by SPE are identification of
potential bottlenecks, determination of the maximum system load, analysis the impact of
architectural changes on performance and understanding the influence of particular
components to performance. The activities in the SPE include assessment of performance
risk, identification of critical Use Cases, selection of key performance scenarios,
construction of performance models, analysis of software resource requirements,
evaluation of the models and finally verification and validation of models. We briefly
discuss these steps below:
Assessment of performance risk is addressed by identifying potential risks and their
impact on the project’s success in order to deal with them systematically. The impact is a
combination of the probability that a failure occurs and the severity of the damage it may
cause.
2
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Identification of critical Use Case and selection of key performance scenarios are
handled by identifying and selecting the scenarios that are important to responsiveness as
seen by users or have performance risk. Those use cases can produce failures in the
system or reduce the success of the system if the performance goals are not met.
Establishing performance objectives is carried out by specifying quantitative criteria.
Response time is the time interval between a user’s request to the system and response
from the system. Throughput is the rate at which the requests are processed by the
system; Utilization is the fraction of time the component is busy processing requests;
Workload intensities specify the level of usage in component.
Construction and Evaluation of performance models: performance models are
obtained from performance scenarios, and they are evaluated by quantifying design
changes which assess trade-offs and highlight the best alternative. Sensitivity studies
indicate the model parameters which produce large changes in the model.
Verification and Validation are the activities that proceed in parallel with the above
activities. Model verification is intended to establish whether the model predictions are a
truthful reflection of the software’s performance, answering to question “are we building
the model right?”. On the other hand, model validation establishes whether the model
exhibits the execution characteristics of the software, addressing the question “are we
building the right model?”.
In this thesis, an analytical method for solving performance models and a risk
methodology are developed and applied to border inspection systems with the goal of
establishing the optimal thresholds between the risk and performance. The Stochastic
Rendezvous Network Model (SRVN) proposed by Woodside [52] and the Layered
Queueing Network Solver (LQNS) [53][54] are the basis for solving the performance
models. The SRVN is used to model the system, and LQNS is used to solve the obtained
SRVN model.

1.3

Thesis Contribution

We consider the following as the contributions in this work.
•

Analyzing the open arrivals in the border inspection model and providing some
basic characteristics of the traveler data traffic.

3
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•

Comparing the results in this thesis with previously published results.

•

Analyzing the risk for a biometric-based border inspection using cost curves.

•

Combination of performance risk and security risk in the border inspection system
in order to find the most suitable thresholds in the system.

1.4

Thesis Outline

The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides basic material about
Layered Queueing Network, UML profile for schedulability, performance and time,
derivation of LQN models from annotated UML diagrams, and finally overviews risk
analysis concepts and methodologies.

Chapter 3 introduces the characteristics of

travelers in the environment of border inspection points.

The result obtained by

analyzing the distribution is provided too. A layered prediction model is devised and
shown to be accurate. Chapter 4 explains our approach to risk analysis of a biometricbased border inspection system. Chapter 5 presents conclusions and future work.
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This chapter supplies a brief overview of analytic performance modeling with
Layered Queuing Network models and software modeling with UML performance
notation, which we use in the analysis in this thesis. We reviewed different risk analysis
methodologies: architectural risk analysis, performance risk analysis and a risk
methodology. Therefore, we gain understanding of the different types that are suitable for
the context, which is defined by misclassification costs from the verification algorithms
deployed in the system.

2.1

Layered Queuing Network Models
The Layered Queuing Network (LQN) model, proposed by Franks, is an extended

queueing model, which we use in the performance analysis discussed in this thesis. We
use LQN performance model to represent system with software queueing and
rendezvous. This modeling technique is well suited for systems with parallel tasks
running on a network.
2.1.1

General Description

An LQN model denotes model-based performance where each layer of the model is
represented by a network of queues. It is described by a directed graph with nodes that
represent software entities and hardware devices, and with arcs that represent service
requests. A LQN task, represented by a parallelogram, can act as a server or a client
interacting with other tasks. Generally, it represents software components. When a task
does not receive requests but only generates requests is called a reference task, and it
represents a pure client or a load generator. On the other hand, a pure server task only
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receives requests and does not initiate requests. A server usually represents hardware
resources such as processors and I/O devices, among others.
Available services through a task are represented by entries, where each entry has its
own demands for other services and execution time which are given as model parameters.
An entry is drawn as a slice of the corresponding task. A single input queue is offered by
every task, where requests for its different entries wait together to be served. A single
request queue is also shared in a multi-server node. A multi-server node is composed of
several identical servers that work in parallel.
Figure 1 shows an example LQN model. At the top there is the client, which sends
requests for verifyData and/or writeInfo services to the task named Application. Each
Application entry requires services from two different entries of the DB task. Every
software task is running on a processor node, drawn as a circle.
The following parameters must be included in the LQN model. If it is an open
workload model, we need to specify the arrival rates.

Otherwise, we specify the

associated populations and “think” times. In addition, for each device, we need to define
the average service time, the average number of visits either when the software task entry
is seen as a client to a device, or when the software task entry is communicating with
another task entry. Finally, for each software and hardware servers, we establish a
scheduling discipline, and the average message delay in each request.

6
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Figure 1 LQN model

Synchronous, asynchronous and forwarded are the type of communication messages
between entries that LQN is able to recognize. A Forwarded message uses a forwarding
chain, so the client, who submits requests, will wait until a replay from the last server
within the chain is received (see Figure 2). Synchronous and asynchronous messages
work in the standard way. In the former, the client is blocked until the requested server
replays as in remote procedure calls (RPC). In asynchronous communication, the client
is not blocked while the server is working autonomously on the received request.

Client
Synchronous
message

waiting

Application
busy

phase1

phase2
forwarding

reply to
idle
original client

DB
busy

idle

phase1

Figure 2 LQN forwarding message
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2.1.2

Task

A task represents a resource, where the resource could be a process in a system,
client, hardware device, and buffer among others. A task always runs on a processor and
has a queue that uses one of the scheduling methods such as, FIFO (first-in, first out),
PPR (priority, preemptive resume) and HOL (head-of-line priority).
2.1.3

Entry

Entries represent different kind of services offered by a task. They are able to
receive just one kind of requests at a time.

Requests can be synchronous or

asynchronous. The parameters in an entry are defined by using either phases or activities.
Activities are recommended when the internal behavior of the task is so complex that
forks and joins are used. On the other hand, phases are appropriate when the behavior of
the task can be specified as a sequence of one to three activities.
2.1.4

Activity

An activity represents the finest level of detail required in order to describe one or
more execution scenarios. Parallelism within task can be represented by using activities,
because they are able to depict concurrent threads of control and also the randomness in
the execution process by introducing probabilities between different paths. Table 1
summarizes the precedence types used to connect activities.
Table 1 Permitted connections between activities in LQN

Name and Description
Connecting arc
Transfer control
And-join
Parallel activities are synchronized at that point

Representation

&
a

And-fork
Start of concurrent execution

a
&
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Or-join
+
a
Or-fork
After executing the activity one of the paths is selected
with probability p.

a
P1

+

P2

Loop
The activity is repeated an average of n times
*

n

a

2.2 UML Profile for Schedulability, Performance and Time (UML
SPT)
UML SPT offers a common framework for annotating UML models with predictive
quantitative analyses capability. Existing and future model analysis techniques benefit
from the offered features [16]. The process of system design and refinement is done
through the parametric understanding of an implementation with functional requirements.
The evaluation is typically done by executing test cases and measuring the results. The
following section focuses on UML Performance notation.

2.2.1

Performance Modeling

Incorporating performance analysis in UML models facilitates the association of
performance quality of service (QoS) characteristics with particular elements of the UML
model. Furthermore, the specification of execution parameters in the UML models
implies their use in modeling tools that will predict performance characteristics. Finally,
performance requirements can be captured straightforward from the design context.
The performance analysis domain model is depicted in Figure 3.

A better

explanation of each element from the domain model is presented next.
Performance context is used to explore a variety of situations concerning a particular
set of resources. In order to explore different QoS values such as load intensity and

9
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response delay, among others, in the same performance context, a parameterization is
needed.
Scenario is an ordered and finite set of activities (scenario steps) that describe the
performance context, with response time and throughput. A workload is defined for each
scenario, representing the intensity of use. The scenario can be either described by paths
that fork, join, loop, and are alternative with some probability.
Workload indicates the intensity of requests over resources within a specific
scenario. Workload specification can be open or closed. Open workloads are used in
systems where jobs enter the system disjointedly of job completions. Generally, they are
modeled through Poisson arrivals since jobs follow that predetermined pattern. In closed
workloads, a fixed number of jobs enter the system and continue circulating within the
scenario with an associated “think time”, which represents an external delay period
outside the system.
Resources are represented as servers.

They can be active or passive.

Active

resources have associated service times and they are the servers in the performance
models. On the other hand, passive resources have associated holding times and they are
acquired and released during scenario execution.

10
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Figure 3 Performance analysis domain model adapted from [16]

The UML extensions required for displaying the relevant performance values are
presented in Table 2. Value types such as PAperfValue and RTarrivalPattern use a BNF
notation that is further explained in [16].
Table 2 UML extensions defined for performance modeling

Stereotype
<<PAcontext>>
<<PAopenLoad>>

Associated Tags

PArespTime
PApriority
PAoccurrence
<<PAclosedLoad>> PArespTime
PApriority
PApopulation
PAextDelay
<<PAstep>>
PAdemand
PArespTime
PAprob
PArep
PAdelay
PAextOp
PAinterval
<<PAhost>>
PAutilization
PAschdPolicy
PArate
PActxtSwT

Value Types
PAperfValue
Integer
RTarrival Pattern
PAperfValue
Integer
Integer
PAperfValue
PAperfValue
PAperfValue
Real
Integer
PAperfValue
PAextOpValue
PAperfValue
Real
{‘FIFO’,’HeadOfLine’,etc}
Real
PAperfValue

11
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<<PAresource>>

2.3

PAprioRange
PApreemptable
PAthroughput
PAutilization
PAschdPolicy
PAschdParam
PAcapacity
PAaxTime
PArespTime
PAwaitTime
PAthroughput

Integer
Boolean
Real
Real
{‘FIFO’,’PriorityInheritance’,etc}
Real
Integer
PAperfValue
PAperfValue
PAperfValue
Real

Transformation from UML to LQN
Previous works [4][19][33][34] have developed methodologies that use information

from different UML diagrams in order to incrementally generate performance models
carrying out an LQN translation technique. The most convenient ones were proposed by
[4][19]. Use Case Diagrams provide information on the workloads, which identify the
services and the users of the system. Sequence Diagrams are used to obtain the software
execution model because they reflect the system behavior given that they describe in
detail the scenarios that are critical to the system performance. Finally, Deployment
diagrams state different physical contexts needed for system analysis [19].
An example of developing a performance model of a Building Security System is
presented in Figure 4-Figure 7 from [35]. The system provides access control and video
surveillance among other functions that are depicted in the use case diagram in Figure 4.
For simplicity, we display only the annotated sequence diagram for the access control
scenario in Figure 5. In the sequence diagram: a user inserts his card into a door reader,
this information is transmitted to a server, which checks the access rights associated with
the user’s card in the data base and then either grants or denies access. This scenario
possesses some requirements, such as the transaction completion time of one second, and
the access request load of about 1 request per 2 seconds on average. The information
from the UML diagrams is required in order to build the layered queueing network
model.

12
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Figure 4 Use Case Diagram of a Building Security System [35]

Figure 5 Annotated Sequence Diagram for the access control scenario [35]
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Figure 6 Deployment of a Building Security System [35]

Figure 7 Layer Queueing Network model for the Building Security system [35]
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2.4

Characterization of Workloads
The type of workload that is employed in the performance model has to be

considered as important as workload metrics such as service demand distribution, think
time, etc, in order to provide accurate representations of the system under study [22].
2.4.1

Open workload

Open workload assumes that a user generates a request, waits to receive a response
and finally leaves. Basically, a new request to the system is only initiated by a new user
arrival. At any instance of time, the system has a different number of jobs. Nevertheless,
the throughput X is assumed to be known and equal to the arrival rate λ, therefore the
main goal is to characterize the distribution of jobs in the system.
2.4.2

Closed workload

In this kind of workload, the system is used unendingly by some fixed number of
users. In general this number of users identifies the multiprogramming level denoted by
N. Every user in the system submits jobs and after receiving the response, waits some
amount of time in order to submit another job request. New requests are initiated after
the completion of previous ones. The total number of jobs in the system is constant and
the total number of users in the system can be defined as N=Nthink+Nprocess where, ones
are thinking Nthink, and other ones are either queuing to run jobs or running jobs Nprocess.
Other parameters such as server load and response time are respectively defined as
fraction of time that the server is busy resulting from the product of the mean service
demand E(S) and the mean throughput X; and the response time, the interval of time
between a request is submitted and resolved.

2.5

Risk
To comprehend the nature of risk, we need several related definitions. Vulnerability

is defined as a flaw in the system that can be unexpectedly activated or purposely
exploited.

Hazard is a situation or event that potential could lead to accidents.

Identifying and assessing those hazards is the first activity that must be carried out within
the risk analysis [24].
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The hazard analysis identifies and assesses those sources of danger on the system. It
can be divided in the following steps:
1. Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) identifies crucial system functions and
general system hazards, which lead to identification of safety design criteria
and requirements in the early life cycle.
2. System Hazard Analysis (SHA) examines possible hazards caused by
interfaces between subsystems that working together can impact system
safety; its main goal is to advise changes and controls and assess design
responses according to safety requirements.
3. Subsystem Hazard Analysis (SSHA) identifies and assesses hazards related
with subsystems that individually can affect the overall system safety.
4. Operating and Support Hazard Analysis (OSHA) examines hazards created
by human-machine interfaces, it is performed throughout system use and
maintenance stages.
There are several models and techniques that can be used in hazard analysis:
Checklist, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis, Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis (FMEA), Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), formal
methods (CSP, CCS, hybrid automata).
After identifying hazards in the system, it is appropriate to define the severity and
probability of occurrence for each recognized hazard.

Finally, we can define risks

associated with the system: the Risk is defined as a combination of the likelihood of an
event and its associated severity. Therefore, risk increases when either the likelihood or
the severity increase and the other component does not decrease by the same proportion
[15].
Risk analysis is conducted in order to find answers to questions such as: what can
fail? How likely is it to happen? And given that it occurs, what are the effects? [1]. The
risk analysis can be performed at the architectural level allowing an early detection and
correction of problems that could be less costly as it will be if detected in a late stage of
the software life-cycle such as implementation.
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2.5.1

Architectural-Level Risk Analysis

It is known that failures of critical components and connectors in the system have a
major impact on the overall system reliability. In [12] Goseva-Popstojanova et al,
proposed a risk analysis process that can be used in the early stages of software lifecycle.
It uses the behavior contained in UML specifications, in particular, use cases and
sequence diagrams in order to establish the risk factors of components and connectors.
These are determined by measuring their dynamic complexity (2.5.1-1) and coupling
(2.5.1-2), respectively. In a given scenario S x , rf i x is the risk factor of component i for
scenario x, DOCix is the normalized complexity of component i in scenario x, svtix is the
severity level of component i in scenario x. EOCijx is the normalized coupling and svtijx
is the severity level for the connector between the ith and the jth components in the
scenario S x .

rf i x = DOCix ⋅ svtix

(2.5.1-1)

rf ijx = EOCijx ⋅ svtijx

(2.5.1-2)

The dynamic complexity is determined by using UML state charts from which we
can obtain both the cardinality of subset of states for a component i in the scenario Sx
(|Cix|) and the cardinality of subset of transitions traversed (tix=|Tix|) (2.5.1-3) and the
normalized dynamic complexity (2.5.1-4).

docix = tix − cix + 2

(2.5.1-3)

docix
DOC =
∑ dockx

(2.5.1-4)

x
i

k ∈S x

The dynamic coupling is determined by using UML sequence diagrams from which
we can obtain the number of messages sent from component i to component j during
scenario Sx (Mijx) and it is normalized by dividing over the total number of messages
exchanged in scenario Sx as in (2.5.1-5).
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EOC =
x
ij

M Tijx

(2.5.1-5)

i , j ∈S x , i ≠ j

MT x

For a given scenario, a severity level is assigned to each component and connector
based on the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis technique. Next, scenario risk factors are
estimated considering multiple failure states in order to represent failure modes with
different severity level. The steps of the methodology are presented in Figure 8 .

Figure 8 Architectural-Level Risk Analysis Methodology. Source [12]

Construction of the scenario risk model requires first, a control flow graph, in which
states map active components and arcs map connectors assuming they have a Markov
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property which allows the representation of the model software execution behavior for
scenario Sx as an absorbing discrete time Markov chain (DTMC). Second, inclusion of
failure states into the DTMC as absorbing states.
Finally, the risk factor for each use case is acquired by averaging the risk factors of
all scenarios Sx present in the use case, and similarly, the overall system risk factor is
obtained by averaging the use case risk factors.
2.5.2

Performance-based Risk Analysis

Performance risk is created by violations of performance requirements [6]. This
methodology indicates both risky software components and risk scenarios by using
annotated UML diagrams such as Use Cases, Sequence diagrams and Deployment
diagrams in order to estimate the probability of performance failure in combination with
the failure severity estimation from the Functional Failure Analysis.
An outline of the methodology is depicted by Figure 9. The methodology, the
demand vector is defined for an action/step of a component and by size of the data
exchanged for an interaction of a connector. A Software Execution Model is obtained by
translating the sequence diagram dynamics into a flow graph whose parameters come
from the demand vectors. A Service demand for each hardware device is obtained from
the annotated deployment diagram.
A stand-alone analysis is executed, where the completion time of the whole scenario
is based on a dedicated hardware platform with a single user workload, if the time value
from this analysis is not violating the performance objective then a posterior investigation
with a realistic workload in the presence of contention for resources is carried out in
order to find the probability of failure. On the other hand, when the time value of the
stand-alone analysis violates the performance objective, it is clear that the software
system deployed on that specific hardware architecture is not suitable for the
requirements, and then the failure probability is set to one.
In the following steps, both calculation of the asymptotic bounds of the performance
model and an estimation of probability of failure as a violation of the performance
objective are achieved. Additionally, the functional failure analysis is done over the
system-level sequence diagram, where information for each event in the system-level
sequence diagram is associated with a failure mode, its effects and its severity level.
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Finally, estimation of the performance risk of a scenario is executed by calculating
the product of the probability that the system fails in meeting the established performance
objective with the severity associated with this failure in the scenario. Identification of
high-risk components in a scenario is done by finding the component with the highest
residence time and identification of high-risk scenarios is done by performing cross
scenarios comparisons through normalization of the overall residence time of components
in a specific scenario with the response time of the scenario.
INPUT:
Performance objective.
UML diagrams: Use case Diagram, Sequence Diagram, and Deployment Diagram.
For each Use Case
For each scenario

STEP1- Assign demand vector to each action/interaction in Sequence diagram; build
a Software Execution Model.
STEP2- Add hardware platform characteristics on the Deployment Diagram; conduct
stand-alone analysis.
STEP3- Devise the workload parameters; build a System Execution Model; conduct
contention-based analysis and estimate probability of failure as a violation of
a performance objective.
STEP4- Conduct severity analysis and estimate severity of performance failure for the
scenario.
STEP5- Estimate the performance risk of the scenario; identify high-risk components.
OUTPUT:
Probability of performance-based risk of the scenarios.
Identification of performance-critical components.
Figure 9 Performance-based Risk Analysis Methodology. Source [6]

2.5.3

Risk Analysis Methodology

The National Institute of Standards and Technology proposed a methodology for risk
management for information technology systems [24]. The methodology consists of
sequential steps which provide a foundation to assess the scope of the probable threat and
the risk associated with the system. Furthermore, an identification of suitable controls for
reducing or eliminating risk can be selected in order to provide better protection of the
mission-critical system.
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Figure 10 presents the selected steps of the risk analysis methodology. System
characterization is the first step, followed by hazard identification, vulnerability
assessment and control and impact analysis.
System Characterization
Hazard Identification
Vulnerability Assessment
Control analysis
Likelihood Determination
Impact Analysis
Risk Determination
Figure 10 Risk Analysis Methodology Processes. Adapted from [24]

System Characterization delineates the system boundaries and the system related
information in order to understand the environment. The information is usually about
hardware, software, system interfaces, data sensitivity and criticality, system mission,
system security policies, among others.

Threat Identification recognizes potential conditions that might exploit a specific
system vulnerability. Given that those potential conditions by themselves in the non
existence of vulnerabilities to exploit do not constitute a risk, it is necessary to consider
threat-sources, vulnerabilities and current controls in order to establish the likelihood of a
threat. Examples of threat-sources are environment, nature or human being.

Vulnerability Assessment identifies and evaluates the vulnerabilities related to the
system environment identified in the system characterization step. Finally, it provides a
foundation for determining mitigation measures.
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Control Analysis studies the current and future controls imposed in the system with
the purpose of minimize or eliminate the probability of a potential threat exploiting
system vulnerability.

Likelihood Determination obtains a general likelihood which suggests the probability
that the vulnerabilities already identified may be exploited within the system. Factors
such as source of the threat and its motivation, nature of the vulnerability, and current
control mechanisms to block possible flaws, should be considered.

High
threat-source is highly
stimulated and capable
Controls are ineffective

Medium
treat-source is stimulated and capable; controls
may block successful vulnerability exploitation

Low
The threat-source is poorly stimulated or capable; controls are at least
significantly effective.

Figure 11 Likelihood Levels and meaning. Adapted from [24]

Impact Analysis measures the unfavorable effect of successful system’s
vulnerabilities exploitation. The unfavorable impact of a security event can be described
in terms of loss or degradation of integrity, availability and confidentiality.

Risk Determination is the determination of risk for a particular threat/vulnerability
pair can be expressed as a function of likelihood of a given threat, and the magnitude of
the impact.
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In this chapter, we present the configuration of the biometric-based border inspection
system (structure and functionalities) using UML diagrams. We build and parameterize
the performance model using information from similar systems [4][27][28][29] and open
workloads. We estimate open workloads by analyzing travelers’ arriving pattern from
operational data at Dulles International Airport [5]. Finally, we create and evaluate
several performance experiments with the purpose of identifying configurations that offer
minimum waiting time among the different types of security and architectural options.

3.1

Problem definition
Nowadays, the most trustworthy mechanism to authenticate users is by using

biometrics. International travelers at a border inspection point authenticate themselves
through their biometrics features, fingerprints and face, which provide an enhancement in
the security of the authentication process. Modeling a system like that is a challenging
task, because it requires attention to multiple factors that may affect the accuracy of the
model [56]. Our research goal is to evaluate the effects on service and waiting time for
different types of security and architectural options within our performance models.
Emerging international standards define the format a machine readable documents
(MRTD). Together with biographical data, MRTD stores document holder’s biometric
information. In order to minimize the likelihood of accepting false credentials, the
authenticity and integrity of the data inside the traveler’s MRTD are reinforced using
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). When presented with decrypted information, the
immigration officer shares traveler’s information with the Traveler Name Server (TNS).
TNS alerts the officer about traveler’s admissibility status. Concurrently, the officer
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interviews the traveler and collects his or her biometric information, currently a digital
photo and ten fingerprints. Collected biometric information is stored and processed at the
Traveler Biometric Server (TBS). If this primary inspection has a successful outcome, the
traveler is admitted into the country, otherwise he or she is referred to a secondary
inspection point where another officer will perform a longer interview and perform
multiple checks against watch lists. [56]
We have been engaged in the development of analytical performance models for
border inspection points. The goal of performance modeling is to analyze suitability of
system requirements, such as the organization of the PKD, optimization of workflows
and maximization of the passenger throughput. A related goal has been the comparison of
modeling costs and benefit between analytical models and elaborate simulation analysis
models.
Our models assume that all travelers possess an MRTD. The performance model
requires determining the type of workload generator, possible bottlenecks, types of
scheduling policy, and the distribution of servers and resources. Workload generators are
generally classified as open or closed [56]. In previous work, Bracchi et. al. [3] [4] used
closed workloads for modeling of border inspection points. Those models served as the
basis for the present work, which is an extension of [3] [4]. One of our contributions is
the use of open workloads. Open workloads are used in systems where jobs enter the
system disjointedly of job completions. On the other hand, in closed workloads, a fixed
number of jobs enter the system and continue circulating within the system with an
associated processing time. From the practical stand point, open workloads represent our
applications better and provide modeling results which are easier to communicate to
customers.

3.2

Software Specification
The border inspection system can be described by its structural and behavioral

software elements [4], where the first one describes logically or physically its software
elements and their corresponding interconnections, and the second one describes the
software comportment at runtime. In describing the requirements, we will follow the
methodology proposed by Bracchi et. al. [4].
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3.2.1

Use Case Diagram

This diagram presents the global interactions including variants between the system
and the actor who is a physical or logical entity demanding services from the system.
For the biometric-based border inspection system, Bracchi [4] identified four main
processes: traveler examination, biographic checking, biometric verification and
biometric identification. Additionally, the related actors to the system under study are:
travelers and the interagency border inspection system. Those processes and actors are
considered as well in the present work.
Figure 12 shows the use case diagram identified for the biometric border inspection
system. In “Appendix A: Detailed Uses Cases and Sequence Diagrams”, we present
expanded use cases and their corresponding sequence diagrams.
The traveler examination process begins when a traveler arrives to the border
inspection point and presents his/her MRTD (machine readable traveler document) to the
primary officer in the booth. The primary officer validates the MRTD by scanning it
through the MRTD reader which returns the MRTD’s corresponding digital signature that
is confirmed by employing the Public Key Certificate stored in the Public Key Directory
or in the MRTD itself. Additionally, the system verifies the Public Key Certificate
Authority, machine readable zone (MRZ) and face image stored in the MRTD. Once the
officer has validated that the MRTD is original, he requests a biographic check while at
the same time he requests the traveler to submit his/her fingerprint and face image, used
for biometric verification (a one-to-one match).

Further, the officer interviews the

traveler in parallel while the system is retrieving the traveler’s profile. The system
alarms the officer when there is a possible mismatch between the records in the system
and the live biometric data, so the officer sends the traveler to a secondary inspection
where a biometric identification (a one-to-many match) process is initiated.
absence of problems, the primary officer grants the traveler access to the country.
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Figure 12 Use Case Diagram for the Biometric-based border Inspection System. Adapted from [4]

The biographic checking process initiates when the primary officer sends the basic
traveler’s information, first and last name, birth-date and MRTD number to the Traveler’s
Name Server (TNS) and the consular consolidated database (CCD) in order to obtain a
consolidated information about the traveler’s immigration status. The TNS retrieves the
traveler’s information from current immigration status and criminal violations, and the
CCD retrieves the picture and consular information related to visa applications,
approvals, refusals and the biometric identifiers captured during the process of MRTD
issuance.
The biometric verification starts when the traveler’s live fingerprints (right slap, left
slap, and thumbs slap) are captured by the fingerprint scanner and a face image is taken
by a digital camera. The system checks the quality of the collected biometric traits. When
the quality of the collected biometric traits is poor, the system will request to repeat the
acquisition of the biometric traits. The collected biometric traits are matched against the
traveler’s biometric templates in the Traveler Biometric System (TBS). Matching scores
for fingerprint and face are generated. The system answers that the traveler is who he/she
claims to be if the final match score is above a threshold. If the system decides that the
traveler is not who he or she claims to be, then the primary officer sends the traveler to
the secondary inspection booth.
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The biometric identification process is activated when the secondary inspection
officer requests a search in a consolidated watchlist with the traveler’s face image
captured at the primary inspection booth while performing an in-depth interview to the
traveler. The traveler biometric database (TB DB) retrieves the top 50 identities after a
complete match, and ranks the retrieved templates.
3.2.2

Sequence Diagram

This type of diagram presents in detail the interactions between system components
that were outlined by the use cases. These interactions are represented by messages. [23]
Using the performance scenarios identified in the use case diagrams which have the
greatest impact on performance and the dynamics of those use cases through the
sequence diagrams, we are able to start building the system performance model.
In “Appendix A: Detailed Uses Cases and Sequence Diagrams”, Figure 44 to Figure
48 present the dynamics of the use cases Traveler Examination, Biographic Checking,
Biometric Verification and Biometric Identification with resource demands for each
scenario step.
3.2.3

Deployment Diagram

This type of diagram illustrates both the physical configuration of the system and the
software allocation on the hardware device, which provide essential information to the
performance model.

We are able to estimate resource demands of interactions by

identifying the hardware devices executing functionalities provided by the software
system and their corresponding service rate.
Figure 13 presents the deployment diagram for the border inspection system under
study. The system contains several primary inspection booths. As described by [4], each
inspection booth has a workstation (POE workstation) that accesses the traveler name
server (TNS) and the traveler biometric server (TBS) through a WAN connection. In our
baseline configuration, the POE workstation stores the Public Key Directory (PKD) as a
dedicated resource. In section 3.4.1, we will analyze and report the performance results
when the PKD is located outside the POE workstation and communicates with it through
a network link.
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Figure 13 Deployment Diagram for the Biometric-based border Inspection System. Adapted from [4]
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3.3

Performance Model Parameters
The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) monitors arriving passenger

processing times in 16 major international airports [5]. CBP data also includes the
number of passengers per hour and the average number of open booths.
Figure 14 to Figure 18 present CBP arrival information from December 2007 at one
of the terminals of the Dulles International Airport. This distribution was used in our
experiments presented later. The data set was normalized to average the number of
travelers per booth per hour. Ensuing distribution is presented in Figure 15.

For

modeling purposes, we assume that the passengers are evenly distributed among the
available booths. December of 2007 was chosen because the new regulation of 10
fingerprint acquisition was implemented at that time. Dulles International Airport was
the first airport to put into action this security upgrade.
Figure 14 shows the average number of passengers arriving per booth per second
throughout the day. It is notorious that there are certain times when no travelers arrive.
There are hours where the load is 75% higher than the smallest load. A significant
variation (error bars) is observed during the night hours up to 2 am. Columns with no
error bars represent a single value. With this kind of pattern in arriving of the travelers at
border inspection points, it seems that modeling the system with open workloads presents
a more realistic approach that the one previously reported with closed workloads [3].
Hourly Average

Average Passengers/second/booth

0.016
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Figure 14 Average Passengers in the month of December 2007
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Figure 15 Passenger Distribution at the Terminal Booths

Figure 16 presents the average daily waiting time. We see that the average waiting
time range is usually between 30 and 50 minutes, and that the upper-bound, the busiest
day, is on Sunday and the lower bound of the system occurs at the middle of the week
were the waiting time is nearly 30 minutes. With this information we can validate our
models because the graph provides reference values for waiting times. Processing time is
not recorded by CBP and therefore it cannot be directly validated.
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Figure 16 Waiting time in December 2007

30

29

Chapter 3: Performance analysis

0.09
Empirical
Poisson
Normal
Generalized Extreme Value

0.08

Probability Density Function

0.07
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0

0

10

20

30

40
50
60
70
Passengers/Hour/Booth

80

90

100

Figure 17 PDF for Dulles Data and Approximated Distributions
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Figure 18 Cumulative PDF for Dulles Data and Approximated Distributions

The distribution of the Dulles Airport data is shown in Figure 15 through Figure 18.
Figure 15 presents the probability density function (PDF) of the observed arrival rates
(passengers per hour per booth).

The mean value for the dataset is 21

passengers/hour/booth and the standard deviation is 13. Figure 17 compares the dataset’s
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PDF with fitted Poisson, Normal and Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) distributions.
Figure 18 presents the cumulative PDF compared to the fitted distributions. The normal
distribution is presented as a reference but it yields negative values, which makes it
inappropriate for the modeling arrival rates in this situation where the mean is close to
zero.
The Poisson distribution may serve as an approximation to the actual distributions
when only the mean estimates are available [20], condition that is assumed throughout
the models. For example, refer to the access control scenario of Figure 5. Poisson
distribution showed to be a poor fit for the observed passenger distribution, as can be
inferred from Figure 17. The goodness of fit was evaluated by the Chi-square test. The
test determined that the best approximation for the actual distribution is a Generalized
Extreme Value (GEV) distribution with k = 0.15, σ = 8.46, and µ = 14.80. The test P
value for GEV fit is 0.39 (thus the confidence in the GEV fit is 61%). The actual
distribution was not used due to limitations in the modeling tool that did not allow for
custom distributions to be implemented.
Using the annotations from the use case diagram and the probability density function
for traveler arrival, we are able to calculate user workloads on different performance
scenarios based on the probabilities associated with the scenarios and with the related use
cases. The probabilities associated with the scenarios are given by <<PAprob>>, which
states the probability that a user invokes the linked use case.

Therefore, an open

workload can be described as a product between the arrival distribution and the
probability associated with relevant use cases.
3.3.1

Execution environment

Table 19 and Table 20 in Appendix B: Performance Parameters, present data
assumptions that are extended from technical reports of analogous systems [27][28][29].
Table 21 to Table 24 in Appendix B: Performance Parameters present the estimated time
of each <<PAstep>> for the sequence diagrams based on the data assumptions and
calculated values.
Delays introduced by inspector officers are assumed to be exponentially distributed
[4]. For example the time spent by the officer to do both the physical reviewing process
of traveler documents and interview process averages 20 seconds.
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process time of each server is calculated by focusing on complex operations to be
executed such as cryptographic operations, query databases, and process requests among
others.

The average time for transferring data through communication channel is

calculated by dividing the size of the data to be transferred by the throughput of the
channel [4][57]. Similarly, the average time for input/output of files from a disk is
estimated by knowing the size of the data to be transferred and the throughput of the
storing device.
Some important service demands are presented here. For a global picture of the
model and a more complete set of parameters see Appendix B: Performance Parameters.
Based on the analysis presented in [4], performance parameters for Biometric
Verification and Identification, Traveler Examination, and Biographic Checking are
defined as follows.
Performance parameters related to Biometric verification and identification:
•

captureFingerprint{PAdemand=(‘pred’,’mean’,(15,’s’)} refers to the necessary time to process
the captured left slap, right slap and thumbs slap of the traveler.

•

checkQuality{PAdemand=(‘pred’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)} is the required time to check the quality of
the biometric trait.

•

capture faceImage{PAdemand=(‘pred’,’mean’,(5,’s’)} is the required time to process an online
traveler’s picture using a digital camera.

•

send-store&matchBiometrics{PAextOp=(‘pred’,’mean’,(0.0329,’s’)} is the necessary time to send
the biometric data collected in the POE Workstation from the traveler (fingerprint scans + face
image) to the TBS, using the WAN connecting them: 0.0329 = (50+20)KB/16.6 Megabits/s

•

read-writeBiometricData{PAextOp=(‘pred’,’mean’,(0.00637,’s’)} is the time for reading a
previously stored face image file (20KB) in the TBS disk and for writing the biometric data
collected

from

the

traveler

(fingerprint

scans

+

face

image)

on

it:

0.00637 = 5.93 ms + ((50 + 20 + 20) KB/ 200MB/s)

•

MatchFingerPrint {PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)} is the time, the TBS spends
comparing how similar the traveler’s fingerprints with its corresponding fingerprints-probe are.

•

MatchFace {PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.05,’s’)} is the time, the TBS spends matching the
traveler’s face image with its corresponding face-probe.

•

compareWatchlist{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(5,’s’) PAextOp=(‘pred’,’mean’,(97.66218,’s’)} is
the time that the TBS disk spends by matching the traveler’s face image with the set of 1 million
face images in the biometric watchlist, it is assumed to be 5 seconds; additionally the TBS disk
consumes time reading the entire watchlist. Consequently, the actual time required to perform the

33

Chapter 3: Performance analysis
computation depends on the size of the watchlist: 5.93ms + (1,000,000×20KB/200MB/s) =
97.66218s
•

rankIdentities {PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)} is the required time by the TBS to rank
the match scores from comparing the traveler’s face image with the set of 1 million face images in
the biometric watchlist.

Performance parameters related to Traveler examination:
•

return

MRTDData{PAdemand=(‘pred’,’mean’,(X,’s’)

PAextOp=(‘pred’,’mean’,(Y,’s’)},

the

PAdemand specifies the time required by the MRTD Reader to read the data stored in the MRTD
where X = MRTDsize bytes /424 kilobits/s. PAextOp refers to the time the MRTD transfers its
data to the MRTD reader. Y = MRTDsize bytes/848 kilobits/s
•

validateMRTD{PAdemand=(‘pred’,’mean’,(X,’s’)} refers to the necessary time to transfer the
MRTD data from the MRTD reader to the POE Workstation through a 12 Mbits/s USB link.
X=MRTDsize bytes/12 MB/s

•

return PKCertificate{PAextOp=(‘pred’,’mean’,(Y,’s’)} specifies the necessary time to read Public
Key Certificates from the Disk of the POE Workstation. The actual reading time depends on the
number of certificates to be read (N=1 or 2): Y =6.5ms + (N*PKCsize KB/ 130MB/s)

•

validate(MRTD_DS){PAdemand=(‘pred’,’mean’,(X,’s’)} refers to the required time to validate
the authenticity of the digital signature on the MRTD. Therefore, we need to compute a hash
function (SHA-1) of the MRTD data, and to verify the authenticity of the digital signature by
applying the RSA algorithm using the Public Key of the MRTD signer (2048 bits) [27]. The time
to perform the operation depends on the amount of data stored in the MRTD: X=
t[SHA_1(MRTDsize bytes)] + t[RSA(2048bits)-verify(20bytes)]

Performance parameters related to Biographic checking:
•

findTravelerData{PAextOp=(‘pred’,’mean’,(0.0118,’s’)} is the necessary time to exchange the
TNS traveler’s biographic and lookup information and a picture of him/her. Our assumptions
about the average size of the traveler’s data are: 5 KB for the biographic data and 20 KB for the
picture. 25KB / 16.6 Megabits/s = 0.0118s

•

return consolidateInfo {PAextOp=(‘pred’,’mean’,(0.00595,’s’)} refers to the required time to
retrieve from the TNS disk traveler’s biographic and lookup data: 5.93 ms + (5 KB / 200MB/s) =
0.00595s

•

return picture{PAextOp=(‘pred’,’mean’,(0.006,’s’)} is the time a traveler’s picture from the CCD
server disk is retrieved: 5.93ms + (20KB /200MB/s) = 0.006s

•

reviewDocs {PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(300,’s’)} is the time a secondary inspection officer
comprehensively reviews the traveler’s documents and belongings and to question him/her.

•

processInspectionData {PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(5,’s’)} refers to the time a secondary
inspection officer needs to decide if authorizing the traveler to enter the country based on the
outcome of checks.
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Following the work of [4] in closed workloads, Figure 19 and Figure 20 below depict
the analytic layered queueing network model for the open workload biometric-based
border inspection configured with the previous parameter settings. Those parameters are
basically service demands on entries and activities, generated workload with reference
tasks, and amount of replicated devices.
Figure 19 presents an overview of the system configuration by showing tasks,
hardware devices and the flow of messages between entries and entries requiring usage of
devices, through request arcs.

On the other hand, Figure 20 offers a more detail

explanation of tasks internal functionality by their corresponding activities and their
communications which are done by configurations using sequences, fork-join, etc.
In our system, travelers are either genuine or impostors. A genuine traveler is a
person whose identity recognition is based on the authenticity of his/her traveler
documents and his/her biometric traits. On the other hand, an impostor traveler is an
individual who has forged his/her traveler documents and/or biometric traits with the
purpose of entering the country using a different identity circumventing the system. The
implications on the system performance are increasing average waiting times due to in
depth search of watch lists, verification of authenticity of traveler’s documents, and
detailed interviewing.
The OrFork in the beginPrimaryInspection entry, was used in order to represent the
option of possible impostors present at the booth, given a predefined prior probability
associated with them. Although, the system triggers an alarm when detecting suspect
impostors, it also does that to some genuine travelers, for this reason at the secondary
inspection a mixture flow of both genuine and impostor arrives. Furthermore, there are
some impostors that the system is unable to detect succeeding in circumventing it, while
other genuine travelers are deported or in custody until more evidence is available so
their identities are reinforced.
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Figure 19 LQN Model for the biometric-based Border Inspection using open workloads
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Figure 20 Expanded LQN Model for the primary and secondary inspection options using open workloads
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3.4

Experiments and Results

3.4.1

Public Key Certificate

The purpose of this experiment is to examine the waiting time results from accessing
public key certificates of authorities issuing MRTDs. The public key certificate may be
stored locally in the MRTD, in a dedicated database or in a shared database. The
validation of certificates of authorities is required in order to verify the authenticity of
travelers’ documents at the inspection booths.
The LQN models are solved in order to obtain their analytical solution and establish
the most suitable configuration that provides the best performance. As mentioned above,
three cases were explored:
1. MRTDs public key certificate is stored inside the traveler document.
2. Dedicated PKD: public key certificate is stored in a database that is access locally
from each officer workstation.
3. Shared PKD: public key certificate is stored in a database that is access by a pool
of airports in a region. In order to express the intensity of requests on the PKD, four kind
of PKI population were studied: 1 airport, 40 airports, 80 airports and 160 airports.
The entries and activities related to configuration 3, basically the inclusion of a PKI
system that communicates with the POE workstation, are taken from [4] and depicted in
Figure 22 . Specific modifications related with inclusion of impostor population, false
match rate, and detailed verification and identification modes on the biometric modules
are based on the same description provided by Figure 20. Parameters of the relevant
LQN entries are shown in Table 3 for the various scenarios.
Table 3 LQN parameterization for Public Key Certificate Experiment

LQN entries

readMRTDdata
scanMRTD
validateMRTD
PKCertificate
verify
send-getPKCert

MRTD
0.1446s
0.2708s
0.0093s
0.0065s
0.0044s
-

Option
Dedicated PKD
0.1184s
0.2368s
0.0082s
0.0065s
0.0044s
-

38

Shared PKD
0.1184s
0.2368s
0.0082s
0.0065s
0.0044s
0.0017s
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Figure 21 presents the result of our model analysis, the average waiting time at the
inspection booths undertaken by travelers. The architectural options: MRTD, dedicated
PKD and shared PKD with 40 airports present similar average waiting times in the
inspection point. The number of travelers that can be inspected every time is limited by
the available primary inspection points. They are able to handle population in the ranged
1 to 1600 with acceptable times, with a larger population the system becomes saturated
and the waiting time goes to infinite. At those points, the only solution would be to
increase the number of available booths, since this is the bottleneck in the system. The
shared PKD within 80 and 160 airports become sooner saturated since more airports are
requesting services to the shared PKD.
MRTD

Dedicated PKD

Shared PKD (1 airport)

Shared PKD (40 airports)

Shared PKD (80 airports)

Shared PKD (160 airports)

Average Waiting Time (min)

40
35
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5
0
0
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Figure 21 Average waiting time using different architectural options
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Figure 22 LQN model for the border inspection system using the shared-PKD option
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3.4.2

Screening Policies

The purpose of this experiment is to examine the effects of increasing the number of
subjects in the watch lists to the inspection and waiting time at the inspection booths.
Watch lists are deployed at border crossing to facilitate quick screening of passengers
against the list of persons of interest. It is assumed that the watchlists are partitioned and
distributed along the TBS disks, in order to increase the system throughput.

The

considered size values for the watchlist and their corresponding parameterization values
in the LQN entries are presented in Table 4.
Figure 23 presents the inspection time experienced by travelers at the booth
inspections when the system performs the identification search over a consolidated
watchlist. The average inspection time is less than six minutes in the secondary line,
when the number of suspects within the list is between 1,000 – 1,000,000, which is
comparable with reported results in the literature [25]. On the other hand, the system
with the current configuration is unable to work with watchlist sizes equal or larger than
to 10,000,000 since it superpasses the acceptable time, thus creating very large queues.
Figure 24 shows how traveler waiting time changes as additional high-risk subjects
are included in watchlist. In the baseline scenario, we assume that the watchlist size is
fixed to be 1,000,000. We can observe from the plots that increasing the watchlist size
directly impacts the waiting time as the number of travelers increases.
Table 4 LQN parameterization for different screening scenarios

Watchlist size
(different subjects)
1,000
10,000
100,000
1,000,000
10,000,000
50,000,000
100,000,000
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LQN entries
(comparison time)
0.03034 s
0.25 s
2.447 s
24.414 s
244.1465 s
1220.709 s
2441.4121 s
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S us pec ts in Watc hlis t

100,000,000
23.01733

50,000,000
10,000,000
1,000,000
100,000
10,000
1,000
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Ave ra g e S e c onda ry Inspe c tion T im e (m in)

Figure 23 Average secondary inspection time for different screening scenarios
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Figure 24 Total waiting time for different screening scenarios

3.4.3

Biometric False Match Rate

False match rate (FMR) is the frequency of the error incurred when deciding that two
biometric strings, the input string and the template are from the same subject, while in
reality they are from different subjects. It occurs when match scores from impostor are
above the system’s threshold. This experiment intends to evaluate how the false match
rate in the biometric system affects the performance provided by the airport inspection
point. Below, we report the FMR as a p1 in the primary inspection interaction, where p1
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expresses the probability that an impostor traveler is accepted as a genuine traveler; the
values considered are shown in Table 5.
Table 5 FMR variation in the LQN model (Biometric False Match Rate Experiment)

FMR
1%
0.1%
0.01%

LQN entries
p1: 0.01
p1: 0.001
p1: 0.0001

The impact in inspection and waiting time associated with variations at the impostors
prior probability is also studied, using the fixed values of FMR=0.01% and
FNMR=0.1%. For the sake of clarity, we relate the different levels of security threat with
the impostor arrival probabilities. The values considered are shown in Table 6 and they
do not correspond with actual values deployed by the Department of Homeland Security
at the airports.
Table 6 LQN parameterization (Biometric False Match Rate Experiment)

P(impostor)
0%
0.01%
0.1%
0.5%
1%
10%

Alert Level Status LQN entries
pi=0
green
pi=0.0001
blue
pi=0.001
yellow
pi=0.005
orange
pi=0.01
red
pi=0.1

Figure 25 represents the total waiting time experienced by travelers when the system
FMR changes from 1% to 0.01%. Results of our model analysis did not present
significant differences in the waiting time for the various values given to the FMR, using
the fixed values of FNMR=0.1% and p(impostor)=0.1%. The low impostor arrivals
probability in combination with the different FMR values allows that the waiting time for
secondary inspection between impostors were almost the same. In addition, the system
performance is heavily affected by the travelers, so the waiting time increases as the
traveler arrival increases. Even more, the system is not saturated as long as the arrival
rate is under 1,400 travelers per hour.
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Figure 25 Total waiting time for different FMR scenarios, assuming P(impostor)=0.001

Figure 26 presents results for different alert level status at the inspections facilities.
For the baseline inspection scenario we assumed a blue alert level or high condition with
the impostor prior probability of 0.1%. We perform an analysis on that parameter,
assigning it the values 0%, 0.01%, 0.1%, 0.5%, 1%, 10%. These values may correspond
to different levels of security threat. A 0% and 0.01% (low condition) correspond to the
low risk of experiencing an impostor, so a trusted traveler population (e.g. pilots,
government officers, etc) is being processed quickly. A 0.1% (guarded condition), 0.5%
(elevated condition), 1% (high condition) and 10% (severe condition) correspond to the
increasing risk of experiencing an impostor. From Figure 26 we can conclude that the
total waiting time is sensitive to large values of impostor arrival probability.

For

example, the 10% rate produces saturation at the inspection booths, given that it is more
probable that the alarms in the system will be activated, so the officers would have to
send more people to a second inspection and the total inspection would take longer, given
that a more detailed interviewing is required.
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Figure 26 Total Inspection time for different impostor prior probabilities
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Figure 27 Total average Inspection time at different combinations of FMR and Watchlist size

Figure 27 offers total average inspection time at different combinations of FMR, and
watchlist size. For a load of 1049 travelers/hour, and a fixed FNMR=0.001. The system
provides the lowest inspection time with the option FMR=0.0001. Nevertheless, going
from a watchlist size of 10 million to 100 million increases the total inspection service
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time from less than nine minutes to nearly 64 minutes. On the contrary, the effect of
watchlist size when below 100 thousand is not significant. Note that the bound imposed
by the traveler population is still an issue. In conclusion, more than increasing watchlist
size, reduction of the False Match Rate offers significant reductions in passenger
screening time.
3.4.4

Replication of PKD

This experiment intends to evaluate the improvement in performance of the system
given that we increase the number of PKD available in the shared PKD configuration.
We use the LQN model for the shared-PKD option (see Figure 22) augmented with the
values corresponding to the number of replicas wanted. We found in the first experiment
that options for 80 and 160 airports become saturated very soon. For this reason we
replicate some PKDs in order to increase the throughput. In Table 7, for 80 airports,
having more than one replica decreases the utilization, thus unsaturating the system. The
intermediate point is attained with 3 PKDs because a reasonable waiting time is achieved
and the utilization is half providing room for further requests. For 160 airports, such
point is attained with 6 PKDs. It must be noted that implementing replicas have an
inherent cost because consistency needs to be guaranteed.
Table 7 Utilization
80 airports
PKD
#
1
2
3
4
5
6

Primary
Inspection
Time (s)
58.47
44.49
44.44
44.43
44.43
45.43

PKD
#

Primary
Inspection
Time (s)

1
2
3
4
5
6

94.02
58.34
47.37
44.46
44.44
44.43

Waiting
PKD
Time
DB
(m)
25 0.9995
19 0.8756
19 0.5856
19 0.4393
19 0.3514
19 0.2929
160 airports
Waiting
Time

∞
25
20
19
19
19

PKD
DB
0.9999
1.0000
0.9999
0.8755
0.7014
0.5846

46

Utilization
PKD
PKD
Proc.
Disk
0.4346
0.5650
0.3807
0.4949
0.2546
0.3310
0.1910
0.2483
0.1528
0.1986
0.1273
0.1655
Utilization
PKD
PKD
Proc.
Disk
0.4347
0.4348
0.4348
0.3807
0.3049
0.2542

0.5652
0.5652
0.5652
0.4949
0.3964
0.3304
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3.5

Analysis
Our results from the performance experiments provide insights about total waiting

time that a traveler would experience during his/her authentication process at the
inspection booths. At the same time, we are able to assess different architectural and
security related options, that could present a major impact on the border inspection
mission, which is to keep inadmissible travelers (e.g. forged traveler’s identity, required
by law enforcement agencies) from entering the country and facilitate the entrance of
travelers who meet the legal requirements to entry the country, without a detriment in any
of the inspection procedures. In all the performance models, we use the arrival rate from
the approximated distribution (see section 3.3), which depicts the requests load that the
system would experienced.
We start evaluating the average waiting time as a result of different localization of
public key certificates of authorities issuing MRTDs. We considered storing the public
key certificate inside the MRTD, on a dedicated PKD inside every POE workstation and
in a PKD shared by the inspection points within 1 airport, 40 airports, 80 airports and 160
airports. From this experiment, we observe (see Figure 21) that the availability of primary
inspection points determines the number of travelers that can be inspected every moment.
The configuration that involves sharing the PKD among 80 to 160 airports, presents
saturation on traveler’s arrival of less than 1,200 and 1,000 per hour, respectively. These
results are consistent since many requests are arriving to the single PKD in both of the
configurations. On the other hand, the configurations of locally stored (MRTD),
dedicated stored (PKD in every POE workstation) and shared PKD among 1 to 40
airports present similar average waiting for the traveler.
Next, we explore the impact of watchlists size on the average secondary inspection
time. The average secondary inspection time is about the same in the cases where the
number of entries is 1,000,000 or below. However, for watchlists size over 1,000,000
entries (see Figure 23), the average waiting time starts increasing due to a slower
response from the Traveler Biometric disks (TBS-disk), which contain the watchlists.
This experiment suggest that implementation of novel indexing schemes on TBS-disks
may improve its response time that will translate in reduction of the secondary inspection
time.
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We performed a sensitivity analysis on the probability of impostors and genuine
travelers arriving at the inspection booths by evaluating the average inspection time and
the total waiting time. We varied the impostor probability from 0% to 10%. Our baseline
scenario assumes that 0.1% of the travelers are impostors and there is one secondary
inspection.

We observed (see Figure 26) that for a relatively large probability of

impostors (10%) among travelers, the system bottleneck becomes the secondary
inspection given that more travelers are likely referred to it. This experiment suggests
that replication of secondary inspections are required when the probability of impostors
arriving at the border inspection start reaching 1% or above.
Another important finding is the performance implication as a result of the system’s
false match rate. The total waiting time in the system is about the same for the FMR’s
different values 0.1% to 1% (see Figure 25). Those results are consistent given the fact
that impostor prior probability and false non-match rate were fixed in all the cases,
therefore the secondary inspections queues are slightly influenced by small waiting time
contributions from the impostors who were detected by the system.
Next, we explore the effects in the total inspection service time when combining
different watchlists sizes with different false match rate values (see Figure 27). In
general, the system using a FMR=0.0001 provides the lowest inspection time. Although,
going from a watchlist size of 10 million to 100 million increases the total inspection
service time approximately six times. On the contrary, the effect of watchlist size of
below 100 thousand is not significant; the total inspection time is almost the same.
Finally, we analyzed the performance impact from having more than one PKD
replica in the configurations that presented saturation (shared PKD among 80 to 160
airports) (see Table 7). The experiment shows reduction in the PKD utilization, up to the
point where the having more than three replicas and six replicas in every case
respectively did not alter the primary inspection time and waiting time.
In summary, results from the previous experiments provide insights about
improvements in the inspection time that travelers would experience in the system when
using different types of configurations. Changes in those configurations may result as a
set up of security measures that have to be implemented in the system.
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The most important goal of border inspection is to identifying “high-risk”
individuals, who can put in danger a country by a terrorist attack. The selection of
travelers that must be exhaustively inspected as opposed to a superficial scrutiny without
increasing the threat is a key issue. Nevertheless, terrorists may have gone through
border inspections without been caught and are still unknown.
One major vulnerability of border inspection system was the lack of an universal
mechanism to include the names of all terrorist in watch lists. This vulnerability was
exploited by Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, two of the hijackers involved in the
9/11, whom even though were identified by the CIA as potential criminals by January
2001, the CIA did not request them to be watch-listed until late August 2001, when they
had already being accepted in the US. [14]
Figure 28 and Figure 29 present some statistics inferred from [11] which reveal that
officers at ports of entry have prohibited the entrance of thousands of individuals and
detected fraudulent travel documents.

The officers at ports of entry likely did not

apprehend all the inadmissible aliens. How many of the inadmissible aliens and other
violators evaded successfully the inspection points is estimated through a program called
Compliance Examination (COMPEX) [11].
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CBP Statistics Fiscal Year 2006
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Figure 28 Identification of High-Risk aliens and other violators
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Figure 29 Fraudulent Documents

4.1

Biometric System
Since 2003, the Border Inspection System contains a biometric subsystem, which is

able to work in three different modalities: identification, verification and watchlist.
Identification (Who am I?) modality is applied when the identity of a subject is
unknown in advance. A biometric pattern is computed from the subject’s biometric
features in order to find out the identity of that person. The entire template database is
compared against the subject’s probe yielding a match score which has to be within a
given threshold in order to provide the top k identities.
Verification (Am I whom I claim I am?) modality is used when the subject provides
an alleged identity. The system performs a comparison between the person’s biometric
query with the template that is already in the system, a score is produced and checked
against a threshold.
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In a watchlist, the subject does not claim an identity; therefore the biometric sample
of the subject is compared with the samples present in the watchlist to detect if the
subject’s pattern is in it. When a subject is found to have similarities to one or more
entries in the watchlist that are higher than the given threshold, the system actives an
alarm and returns the list of identities from the watchlist that triggered the alarm. The
system could incur in two types of errors: miss rate and false hit rate. Miss rate is when
the system pulls out wrong identities without including the right one or a reject and the
subject is present in the watchlist.

False hit rate is when the alarm is activated by a

subject that is not present in the watchlist.
Biometric signatures and their corresponding templates are different.

Their

similarity depends on the acquisition method, user interaction with the acquisition device,
the acquisition environment, and the possible variations present in the traits due to
physiological

changes

[30].

Some

of

the

common

reasons

for

biometric

signal/representation variations are:

•

Inconsistency in the biometric presentation: The signal obtained by the
sensor from a biometric trait relies on both the intrinsic trait characteristic
and the way the trait is offered. For example, the three-dimensional shape of
a finger is mapped into the two-dimensional surface of the sensor accordingly
to the pressure and contact that the finger put on the sensor surface, given
that, the finger is an elastic object and the projection of the finger surface into
the sensor surface is not exactly controlled, different impressions of a finger
are related to each other by various transformations. Additionally, it is
possible that each impression of a finger may represent a different portion of
finger’s surface introducing additional spurious features.

•

Irreproducible Presentation: Biometric identifiers are susceptible to wear
and tear, malfunctions, injuries and physiological development. For example,
the ridge structure of a finger can change either permanently or temporarily
by injuries, manual work, and accidents, among others. Hand geometry
measurements might not be reproducible when the user is wearing different
kinds of jewelry each time. Face recognition is affected by facial hair,
makeup, accidents, external accessories that correspond to irreproducible face
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representations. A person’s voice changes as a result of health problems, for
example a common cold, affecting a voice recognition system. These events
and more contribute to dramatic variations in the biometric trait signal
captured at different acquisition instants.

•

Imperfect Signal/Representational Acquisition: The acquisition environment
in real scenarios is not perfect and produces extraneous variations in the
acquired biometric signal. For example, poor-quality fingerprint acquisitions
are caused by a non-uniform contact with the sensor and the dryness of the
skin, thin/worn-out ridges, skin disease, sweat, dirt, and humidity in the air,
which lead to either spurious or missing minutiae. Different illuminations
cause prominent differences in the facial appearance. The voice signal is
affected by the channel bandwidth characteristics. The use of different image
processing operations could perturb feature localization. High inter-class
similarity (biometric traits from different subjects are similar) due to either
inherent lack of distinctive information in the biometric trait or the
representation used for the biometric trait is too restrictive, finally the feature
extraction algorithm could introduce some measurement errors.

Variations in the biometric signal/representation lead to error rates in the biometric
authentication system, since the matching module has to decide which of the following
hypotheses is true:
The null hypothesis

H O ⇒ the two samples do not match, the input does

not come from the same subject as the template.
The alternate hypothesis

H a ⇒ the two samples match, the input comes from

the same subject as the template.
The two errors that a matcher can present are:
I. False Match (FM): Deciding that the input and the template are from the
same individual, while in reality they are from different people, deciding Ha
when Ho is true. The frequency with which this occurs is called the False
Match Rate (FMR) (3.4.4-1). An impostor can generate a high match score
(s>T), thus causing an FM.
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∞

FMR=

∫ p (s | H

o

= true )ds

(3.4.4-1)

s =T

II. False Non-Match (FNM): Deciding that two biometrics, input and template
are not from the same identity, while in reality they are from the same
identity; deciding Ho when Ha is true. The frequency at which this occurs is
called the False Non-Match Rate (FNMR). A genuine subject can generate a
low match score (s<T), thus causing a FNM.
T

FNMR=

∫ p (s | H

a

= true )ds

(3.4.4-2)

s = −∞

Unfortunately, the non-match score distribution typically overlaps the match score
distribution. Subsequently, it is not feasible to choose a threshold for which FMR=0 and
FNMR=0. A threshold must be defined based on the security level that the system must
offer. The lower chance of False Match implies a higher security level. This will cause
some level of inconvenience for genuine users.

Figure 30 Common Biometric Error rates

In the border inspection system, frequent flyers will usually produce lower error rates
since they are more habituated to interact with the system. Furthermore, studies have
shown that there are differences in recognizing different persons with respect to their
biometric identifiers. Among them, some will produce higher error rates than others
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[2][7]. Another important fact is the fraud rate, i.e., the percentage of the population that
is attempting to defraud the system.
Finding the most appropriate FNMR and FMR in our models is one of our major
goals, since we can evaluate performance scenarios where impostors are not detected
during border inspection process, and genuine travelers are inconveniently rejected.
4.1.1

Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) Curve

A ROC curve is one method of assessing classification performance in two
dimensions of binary class classifiers; the graph plots the FMR against FNMR [8]. The
set of points in the curve come from variations in the setting of a classifier’s threshold.
The ROC curve provides an estimate of the predictive characteristics of a classifier.
Figure 31 presents a ROC curve with different application scenarios.

Figure 31 FMR vs. FNMR ROC curve. Source [30]

4.1.2

Vulnerabilities of Biometric Systems

Even though, biometric authentication systems have numerous advantages over
traditional authentication systems [17], they are not exempt of weak points that can be
exploited by attacks [21].
A biometric system is depicted in Figure 32, where modules may be vulnerable to
the following attacks:
1. Fake biometrics are provided to the sensor as input, for example synthetic finger,
face makeup, or a face disguise.
2. Resubmitting previously stored digitized biometrics signals: In this mode of
attack, a recorded signal is replayed to the system, bypassing the sensor.
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Examples include the presentation of an old copy of a fingerprint image or the
presentation of a previously recorded audio signal.
3. The feature set obtained at the feature extraction module is chosen by the attacker
via a Trojan horse in the module.
4. Fraudulent modification of stored templates: the attacker may modify one or more
templates in the database with the intention of accepting a fraudulent subject or rejecting
subjects associated with the corrupted template. Biometric systems storing the template in
smartcards are susceptible to this kind of attack.
5. Replacement of features obtained from the input signal with a different fraudulent
feature set. For example, the communication channel between the feature extraction
module and the matcher module can be interfered in order to alter specific packets.
6. Attack to the communication channel between the stored templates and the
matcher by intercepting and modifying the information traveling on it, this type of attack
can be replayed in other moment for gain access.
7. Alteration of the matcher module in order to emit pre-established match scores.
8. Alteration of the final decision is the most critical attack, given that the system
becomes useless, even though its recognition framework possesses excellent performance
characteristics.
These attacks can be minimized by incorporating liveness detection of the entity
originating the input signal (attack at points 1,2), encrypting the communication channels
(attack at points 5,6) , placing the matcher and the database in a secure location (attack at
points 4,5,7) using cryptography at the decision module (attack 8), mutual authentication
between each pair of modules, hardening of database server, among others [32].
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Figure 32 possible Attack points in a biometric authentication system, adapted from [21].

4.2

Risk Model
Predicting the number of high-risk aliens who may bypass the border security

inspection system is currently one of the most challenging problems. Some approaches
have been developed in order to increase the accuracy in the biometric modules [25].
They formulate the identification as a game theory problem where the Government uses
some parameters in order to maximize the detection probability and the impostors want to
minimize the detection probability by providing an image of poor quality. Classifying
regular travelers as high-risk ones implies the application of several verification
procedures, therefore increasing the inspection time which translates in fewer officers
available. On the other hand, misclassifying a high-risk alien as a low-risk traveler
carries the risk of immigration failure and its cost implications in the society.
Let us define the set of inspection points as I. I is divided into two disjoint sets, I1 is
the set of primary inspection points which are mandatory for all travelers and set I2 which
is the set of secondary inspection points. If threshold η1 at I1, is not met, an inspector
must perform an exhaustive examination so the traveler could be cleared out or detained
based on a second threshold η2.
We assume that every inspection point in I has a sequence of steps, each intended to
check one particular out of the N known possible treats, such as: construction of a
fraudulent MRTD using materials from legitimate documents, alteration of MRTD by
either substituting the photograph, or altering both the text in the visible zone and
machine readable zone (MRZ). Furthermore, there are impersonation attacks, where a

56

Chapter 4: Risk Analysis

high-risk traveler alters his biometric traits, like face (by using plastic surgery, masks or
makeup), fingerprint (by cuts, bruises, among others) in a way that it resembles a low risk
traveler.
Figure 33 presents possible technical hazards in the biometric-based border
inspection system where each device in the system could introduce some level of
inaccuracy in the inspection process. Security attacks related to Trojan horses, software
component replacement, and communication channels among others are depicted in
Figure 32.
Table 8 presents the severity of each component for the border inspection system that
can occur. We are assuming that methods of liveness detection are used in the fingerprint
sensors, there is an officer guiding the biometric acquisition, the communication channels
are well protected against eavesdropping, replay attacks, man in the middle and brute
force attacks.
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Pre-scanned Travelers

Check
for
valid
MRTD

Check for
Traveler’s
biographic

1/6

2

Capture
fingerprint

3

Capture
faceImage

Check for
information
on TNS

4

information

2
5
No
Restrain

Above
η2?

5
Secondary
Inspection
(if
necessary)

Yes

No

Above
η1?

2

Check for
information
on
watchlist

Yes
Accept

Technical Threats:
1. MRTD scanner overloading, e.g. interference, power surges, input flooding
2. DB compromise, e.g. DB with modified entries or identity associations changed,
furthermore, without recent updates (see Table 9)
3. Fingerprint scanner disrupted service, high failure to acquire.
4. Digital camera spoof by disguise, facial hair and accessories.
5. Threshold bad configuration, e.g. illegitimate traveler is likely to result in a
successful match decision.
6. POE workstation is not able to connect to PKI directory, high access time to PKI
directory.

Figure 33 Technical threats in the biometric-based border inspection system

Table 8 Severity Analysis for a biometric-based border inspection system

Triggered hazard
Mismatch between
stored template in
TNS database and
probe in MRTD
Mismatch between
stored template in
TBS disk and
MRTD

Cause
System fails to
inform officer that
the traveler needs a
second inspection
System fails to
inform officer that
the traveler is
required by law
enforcement

Fault
Failure to match the
impostor traveler,
who is a terrorist.
Failure to detain a
bad alien
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Criticality
High

High
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Update in TBS disk
has not be executed,
the watchlist is not
the most recently
one.
Incorrect search of
inconsistencies in
biographic data
within traveler’s
documents.

System fails to
inform officer that
the traveler is
required by law
enforcement
Officers at primary
and/or secondary
inspection point fail
to detect
inconsistencies in
traveler’s
documents
Mismatch between
System fails to
captured facial
inform officer the
features and the
real traveler’s
stored template
identity
Data inaccuracies,
System fails to
omitted and
inform the officer
inactivated fields,
the current suspects
duplicate records in in government
watchlists [13]
watchlists
Poor quality in
System is not able
fingerprints due to
to collect
genetics, hard labor fingerprints and
or deliberately done. perform verification
5% of the general
and identification.
public
10% of those on the
watchlist [25].
Mismatch between
System flags to the
stored template in
officer that the
TNS database and
traveler needs a
probe in MRTD
second inspection,
when he is who
claims to be.

Failure to detain a
bad alien

High

Failure to detect
fraudulent
documents

High

Failure to identify
an impostor alien

High

Failure to detain a
traveler required by
law

High

Failure to
authenticate a
traveler in the
system.

High

Failure to no match
the genuine traveler

Low

Table 9 presents the approximate update time among the databases used in real
border inspection systems [18]. The maximum lapse of time for executing updates is
monthly, which could create a security hole in the system.
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Table 9 Databases at port of entry and their approximate update time [18]

Database
CCD
TBS (IDENT)
TNS (APIS)
PKD

Update time
Days / weeks
Days/weeks/months
Hours
Undefined

Our risk model considers misclassifications due to the limitations of biometric
identification system. For that reason, we evaluate different levels of security related to
misclassification costs over the classification algorithms that may be deployed at the
border inspection and how their results would impact the waiting time in the system.
4.2.1

Cost Curves

Cost Curves present graphically the expected cost of misclassification of classifiers
along the range of their operating points. Additionally, they can show confidence
intervals and statistical significance when comparing their error rates, which cannot be
done easily by using ROC curves [8].
The coordinate axis in Cost curves are represented by probability cost function
PC(+) in x obtained as in (4.2.1-1) and by the normalized expected misclassification cost
in y obtained as in (4.2.1-2). Since we are dealing with misclassification, let us denote
class “+” as impostor and class “-“ as genuine. The cost of misclassifying a genuine user
as an impostor is denoted by C(+|-) and C(-|+) denotes the cost of incorrectly classifying
an impostor as a genuine. Probabilities of an user being an impostor or a genuine user, at
the deployment of the system, are represented by p(+) and p(-) respectively.

PC (+ ) =

p(+ ) ∗ C (− | + )
p (+) ∗ C (− | + ) + p (− ) ∗ C (+ | − )

Norm( E [Cost ]) = ( FMR − FNMR ) ∗ PC (+ ) + FNMR

(4.2.1-1)

(4.2.1-2)

An example of a cost curve including possible regions is depicted in Figure 34.
Trivial classifiers such as ones that either classify all the users as genuine or classify all
the users as impostors are characterized by line connecting (0,0) to (1,1) and line
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connecting (1,0) to (0,1) respectively. Points above these lines correspond to cases where
the performance of a classifier is worse than the trivial classifiers. Finally, best and worst
cases are represented by line (0,0) to (0,1) and line (0,1) to (1,1) respectively. Recall that
the best case occurs when the classifier correctly classifies the users and the worst case
occurs when the classifier misclassifies all the users.
We are interested in the region where classifiers perform better than trivial ones, then
the range of normalized expected cost that suffices our model evaluation is (0,0.5) a long
the probability cost PC(+) in (0,1).
Cost curves are constructed by drawing lines between points (0,FNMR) and (1,
FMR) for all possible values obtained by moving the threshold in the classifier. All the
intersection points from left to right are connected so the lower envelope of the cost curve
is created. Every line in the cost curve corresponds to a point (FNMR, FMR) in the ROC
curve given that they have a bidirectional point/line duality.
1
always wrong

0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6

always classify to impostor

Norm(E[Cost]) 0.5

always classify to genuine

0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1

always right

0
0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Probability Cost PC(+)

Figure 34 Possible regions in a cost curve

A cost curve analysis provides the foundations for selecting the model under which
the overall misclassification cost is minimum, taking into account the misclassification
cost ratio defined as (4.2.1-3). The probability cost function PC(+) can be rewritten as
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(4.2.1-4). Misclassification costs can influence the tendency for deciding on models and
model parameters considered the most appropriate. This type of analysis is incorporated
in our risk model, so we can use the performance of fingerprint and face matchers
publicly available.

μ=

C (+ | − )
C (− | + )

PC (+) =

(4.2.1-3)

p(+ )
p(+) + p(− ) * μ

(4.2.1-4)

Martonosi et al [50] studied the effectiveness of terrorist detection by prescreening
systems at the airports before travelers get into the airplane. Their system may be viewed
as an analogy to our border inspection system. Following their ideas, probabilities about
the flow of impostors in the border inspection system are defined in Table 10.
Table 10 Definition of Probabilities associated with impostors at the primary and/or secondary
inspection points

P(hr ,+)

Prior probability that an actual impostor is classified as
high risk (hr) visitor.
Fraction of low risk (lr) visitors that are selected for
secondary inspection
Conditional probability that an impostor is detected in
the primary inspection
Conditional probability that an impostor is detected in
the secondary inspection.

P ( select | 2 nd Insp, lr )
P (detain | 1st Insp,+)
P(detain | 2 nd Insp,+)

We combine our cost curve analysis with the corresponding risk resulting from the
product of the severity level with posterior probability related to impostors and genuine
travelers:

(

P(lr ∩ unselect 2nd Insp ) = (1 − P (hr ,+) ) ⋅ 1 − P( select 2nd Insp | lr )

(

= P(lr ,+ ) ⋅ 1 − P ( select 2nd Insp | lr )

)

)

P (+ ∩ check 2nd Insp) = P(hr ,+ ) + P(lr ,+ ) ⋅ P( select 2 nd Insp | lr )

{[

]

Risk = 1 - P (detain | 1st Insp,+) ⋅ P(lr ∩ unselect 2nd Insp )

[

]

}

+ 1 - P(detain | 2nd Insp,+) ⋅ P (+ ∩ check 2nd Insp ) ⋅ Severity
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(4.2.1-5)

(4.2.1-6)
(4.2.1-7)
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Given

P ( pass | 1st Insp,+ ) = 1 − P(detain | 1st Insp,+ )

that

and,

similarly,

P ( pass | 2 nd Insp,+) = 1 − P(detain | 2nd Insp,+ ) , equation (4.2.1-7) can be simplified as:

{

Risk = P ( pass | 1st Insp,+ ) ⋅ P (lr ∩ unselect 2nd Insp )

(4.2.1-8)

}

+ P ( pass | 2nd Insp,+ ) ⋅ P (+ ∩ check 2nd Insp ) ⋅ Severity

The cost of misclassifying a genuine user as an impostor can be rewritten as

{

C (+ | − ) = P(detain | 1st Insp,−) ⋅ P(lr | − ∩ unselect 2 nd Insp )

}

(4.2.1-9)

+ P(detain | 2nd Insp,−) ⋅ P(− ∩ check 2 nd Insp ) ⋅ 1

Also, the cost of incorrectly classifying an impostor as a genuine, C (− | + ) , is:

{

C (− | + ) = P( pass | 1st Insp,+) ⋅ P(lr ∩ unselect 2nd Insp )

}

(4.2.1-10)

+ P( pass | 2nd Insp,+) ⋅ P(+ ∩ check 2 nd Insp ) ⋅ 100

We considered the methodology shown in Table 11 for determining the overall
system performance according to the required level of risk of the system. In section 4.2.2
we analyzed the cost curves at the light of the performance results obtained from section
3.4.
Table 11 Proposed Methodology combining Risk and Performance for a Software System

Construct the LQN model from the Use case diagram,
deployment diagram, sequence diagram and performance
annotations.
For each scenario
For each value of the system threshold
Calculate FNMR and FMR
End
Construct the Cost curve
Calculate cost ratio based on equations (4.2.1-9)(4.2.1-10)
For each misclassification cost ratio
Calculate Probability Cost and Expected Cost
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End
End
Find the best scenario where Expected Cost is the lowest
Select the corresponding FNMR and FMR from the previous step
Map those thresholds in the performance models
Calculate overall system performance
4.2.2

Cost Curves for Face Recognition and Fingerprint Recognition

Classification of travelers as impostors (high-risk aliens) or genuines (low-risk
aliens), during the authentication process in the border inspection system as a result of
fixed system’s thresholds, have different types of security risk costs.

It is highly

undesirable to misclassify a high-risk traveler as low-risk since high-risk individuals are
getting into the country defeating the main goal of the border security system. On the
other hand, it is undesirable to misclassify a low-risk traveler as a high-risk one since we
are overloading the system with comprehensive traveler checks that may cause the
detriment of the system responsiveness. Our research goal is to demonstrate that varying
the system thresholds induce by low risk costs at the border inspections. Under a given
range of probability cost and cost ratios, we are able to assess system responsiveness as it
relates to waiting time and inspection time.
Following our methodology (see Table 11), we utilized the publicly available
performance matching rates of face and fingerprint recognition algorithms reported in
Face Recognition Vendor Test 2006 [9] and Fingerprint Vendor Test 2003 [10],
respectively. We created the cost curves associated with every classification algorithm in
each modality (face and fingerprint) by drawing lines between the points (0,FNMR) and
(1, FMR) for all the available pairs (FMR,FNMR) in the Receiver Operator Characteristic
(ROC) curve of each algorithm.

All the intersection points from left to right are

connected so the lower envelope of the cost curve is created. Additionally, we defined a
set of probabilities and misclassification costs for every scenario that considers the
different alert level status in the system (see Table 12). Finally, we cross-relate the
information from the cost curves (e.g. FMR, FNMR, normalized expected cost) with our
performance models in order to estimate the impact to the traveler’s waiting time.
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Figure 35Figure 35 shows the recognition performance results from state-of-the-art
computer algorithms and human face recognition using a large-scale experiment setup in
the Face Recognition Vendor Test (FRVT) 2006 [9]. The dataset consisted of a pool of
single frontal facial faces across illumination changes, where half of these pairs were
match pairs (images from the same person) and half were non-match pairs (images from
different people).

The experiment matched face images taken under controlled

illumination against face images under uncontrolled illumination. The seven computer
algorithms used were: Viisage (V-norm), Tsinghua U. (Ts2-norm), SAIT (ST-norm),
Neven Vision (NV1-norm), Identix (Idx1-norm), Cognitec (Cog1-1to1), and Sagem
(SG1-1to1). Among these algorithms, the Tsinghua U. (Ts2-norm) algorithm performed
better than humans, Viisage (V-norm) and SAIT (ST-norm) algorithms had a similar
performance.

Figure 35 ROC curve for performance matching of 7 algorithms for Face images. Source [9]

Figure 36 shows the recognition performance results from single-finger flat and slap
in a medium scale test in the Fingerprint Vendor Technology Evaluation (FpVTE) 2003
[10]. Images used in the experiments were obtained from livescan devices. Comparison
of a single dataset against itself was performed; the dataset was formed from 10,000
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images, where 5,000 images were single-finger flats and the remaining images were
single-finger segmented slaps. Among the eighteen algorithms used in the experiment,
Nec and Cogent algorithms had the best recognition performance.

Figure 36 ROC curve for performance matching of 18 algorithms for fingerprints. Source [10]

In Table 12, we defined for every alert level status in the system (severe, guarded
and low) class distributions, p(+) and p(-), that may be deployed. We estimate the
probability cost (PC) values for the four cost ratios µ (1:10, 1:100, 1:1000, and 1:10000).
Table 12 Assumed probabilities for the risk scenarios

Probabilities
p(+ ) = 0.01
p(− ) = 0.99

p(+ ) = 0.001
p(− ) = 0.999
p(+ ) = 0.0001

μ=

C (+ | − )
C (− | + )

0.1
0.01
0.001
0.0001
0.1
0.01
0.001
0.0001
0.1
0.01

PC =

p(+ )
p(+ ) + p(− ) ∗ μ
0.091743
0.502513
0.909918
0.990197
0.009911
0.090992
0.500250
0.909174
0.000999
0.009902
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Severe condition

Guarded condition
Low condition
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p(− ) = 0.9999

0.001
0.0001

0.090917
0.500025

Figure 38 to Figure 40 present the corresponding cost curves for the face modality
for every alert level status that a border inspection could experience by a given
probability of the impostor population. When the ratio cost is 1:10 and with the assumed
impostors probabilities (0.01, 0.001, and 0.0001), the Probability Cost approaches zero
no matter which alert level is deployed. Furthermore, the Probability Cost decreases
(moves towards the right direction) as long as the impostor prior probability decreases.
Table 13 presents the analysis of cost curves for face matching algorithms, within the
range values of 0.01, 0.001, and 0.0001 impostor probability. It is observed that face
modality does not perform satisfactory in the severe and guarded conditions at ratio cost
1:1,000. The total waiting time experienced by the travelers at the border inspection
system is high (∞), making it infeasible to perform recognition since there is saturation at
the second inspection. This scenario may not be adequate for the border inspection
system.
Table 13 Cross-relation between cost curves for Face modality and the performance models

p (+ )

C (+ | − )
C (− | + )
0.01
0.001
0.01
0.001
0.0001
0.001
0.0001

μ=

0.01
0.001
0.0001

PC =

p(+ )
p(+ ) + p(− ) ∗ μ
0.502513
0.909918
0.090992
0.500250
0.909174
0.090917
0.500025

FNMR

FMR

0.175
0.367
0.00152
0.175
0.367
0.00152
0.175

0.073
0.003
0.322
0.073
0.003
0.322
0.073

Norm( E [Cost ])

0.123743674
0.035789848
0.030681116
0.1239745
0.036060664
0.03065708
0.12399745

Total waiting
time (min)
∞
∞
29.81656

∞
∞
28.08652

∞

Recalling the performance experiments p(+)=0.01 and FMR=0.0001 and
FNMR=0.001 indicates a waiting time near twenty minutes. This is shown below in
Figure 37. On the other hand, with the misclassification cost ratio of 1:100 and 1:1000
and an arrival rate of 1049 travelers/hour, we found that the combination of all these
parameters in the system produce an infinite waiting time since the secondary inspection
is unable to attend the high load created by genuine travelers incorrectly classified.
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Total average processing Time (min)

100

Waiting Time

90

∞

Inspection Time
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80
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40
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0
0
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0.005
Impostor - Prior Probability

0.01

0.1

Figure 37 Total Inspection time for different impostor prior probabilities using FMR=0.0001 and
FNMR=0.001

From Figure 38 to Figure 40 we find that V-norm and Ts2-norm are the two face
recognition algorithms that offer the best performance. We are able to distinguish the
range of Probability Cost where the algorithm V-norm outperforms Ts2-norm. The
operating range for the lower envelope of Ts2-norm algorithm is 0.45<PC(+)<=0.99 and
it does not include the lowest extreme cost ratio (1:10) in any of the three configurations.
V-norm has the lower expected cost with 1:10 cost ratio for all values of PC(+). The
maximum difference in expected cost for this cost ratio is about 58% between the Ts2norm and V-norm. On the other hand, the operating range for V-norm algorithm is
slightly narrower than the one in Ts2-norm, 0.00099<=PC(+)<0.45 and it does not
include the highest cost ratio (1:10000) in any of the three configurations because the
Ts2-norm has the lower expected cost with that cost ratio for all values of PC(+). The
maximum difference in expected cost for that cost ratio is about 56% between the Vnorm and Ts2-norm. In conclusion, when the system has to be deployed in an extreme
risky environment it is recommended to use the V-norm while in a safer environment the
Ts2-norm algorithm would lead the lowest expected misclassification cost.
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Performance
difference

Figure 38 Cost curves for face matching algorithms – Severe condition.

Performance
difference

Figure 39 Cost curves for face matching algorithms - Guarded condition
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Figure 40 Cost curves for face matching algorithms - Low condition

Figure 41 to Figure 43 show the corresponding cost curves for the fingerprint
modality for every alert level status that a border inspection could experience by a given
probability of the impostor population. NEC algorithm offers the smallest normalized
expected cost among the algorithms 123IDM2, Avalon, Biolink, Cogent, Identix and
Motorola. Cogent shows similar recognition performance in the ROC curve (see Figure
36), but in the cost space is well separated from the NEC algorithm. The maximum
difference between them is about 76% (0.0009 compared to 0.0037) which occurs when
PC(+) is about 0.7913.
Table 14 shows normalized expected costs and their FMR and FNMR for the
fingerprint modality. Contrary to what was revealed with the face modality, performance
of fingerprint is highly satisfactory since the total waiting time is in the range of 20 to 32
minutes. The normalized expected cost is two orders of magnitude lower than in the case
of face recognition algorithms and the FMR – FNMR ratio corresponds to acceptable
configurations desired in the border inspection system.
The NEC algorithm includes all the cost ratios, with the highest normalized expected
cost at 0.0013 in the operating range 0.3625<=PC(+)<=0.5501.
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Table 14 Cross-relation between cost curves for Fingerprint modality and the performance models

p (+ )

0.01
0.001
0.0001

μ=

C (+ | − )
C (− | + )

0.01
0.001
0.01
0.001
0.0001
0.001
0.0001

PC =

p(+ )
p(+ ) + p(− ) ∗ μ

0.502513
0.909918
0.090992
0.500250
0.909174
0.090917
0.500025

FNMR

FMR

Norm( E [Cost ])

0.001276
0.002026
0.0001834
0.001276
0.002026
0.001276
0.002026

0.0013
0.0006
0.0031
0.0013
0.0006
0.0013
0.0006

0.00128806
0.000728457
0.000448787
0.001288006
0.000729518
0.001278182
0.001312964

Figure 41 Cost curves for fingerprint matching algorithms – Severe condition
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Total
waiting time
(min)
28.0293
32.32856
20.26925
26.62272
30.98755
20.11963
26.48694
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Figure 42 Cost curves for fingerprint matching algorithms – Guarded condition

Figure 43 Cost curves for fingerprint matching algorithms – Low condition
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5.1

Research Summary
As biometric-based border inspection systems increase in size and complexity, the

need to evaluate their performance and security risk becomes critical. The use of analytic
models provided an opportunity for exploring design and configuration alternatives. The
benefit of analytical model is that their solution times are significantly faster than what
can be expected from simulations.
This thesis uses the analytic modeling tool called LQNS (Layered Queueing
Network Solver) to solve open model for a biometric-based border inspection system and
Cost curves to evaluate risk.
First, we constructed a performance model of a biometric-based border inspection
system by using available traces corresponding to average traveler arrivals of similar
deployed systems [5] and information from technical reports [27][28][29]. We used this
information as the traveler’s workload intensity, where the range of workload intensities
goes from low to peak. We estimated the software resource requirements using the
information from available literature, technical reports, and educated guesses. We created
several performance experiments in order to evaluate different type of system
configurations related to screening policies, to configuration of system’s thresholds, to
localization of public key certificates database, and finally to replication of public key
directories when using a centralized database.
Second, we established a security risk model of a biometric-based border inspection
by creating cost curves of the biometric algorithms’ recognition performance that may be
deployed. We considered our system risk criticality as is either high or low, given that a
traveler may be an impostor (high-risk) or a genuine (low-risk). We considered three
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different security scenarios, such as severe level, guarded level and low level. For each
level, we studied different misclassification cost ratios which range from the least costly
to the most costly. Additionally, we estimated the normalized expected cost at those
misclassification ratios.
Third, we analyzed a combination of performance and security risk in the border
inspection system in order to find the most suitable biometric thresholds. Using the cost
curves approach and the LQN models, we were able to explore the interplay between the
loads imposed by the traveler arrivals, and the system security.
The biometric-based border inspection system performance is dramatically affected
by increasing the size of watchlists and by changing the false match rate of the system.
Among the configuration options and the level of security, it is clear that the system
saturates when the size of the watchlist is larger than 1,000,000 entries. On the other
hand, watchlist sizes between 1 thousand and 1 million entries at a fixed FMR and
FNMR of (0.0001 , 0.001) causes marginal changes in the average inspection time.
Variations at the FMR with a fixed watchlist size creates saturation in the system sooner
than the system with different watchlist sizes. Our experiments suggest that FMR has a
great impact in the overall system performance and security.
We have analyzed a performance model of a biometric-based border inspection
system under a risk/security trade-off view with the aim to find the most suitable
operating set-ups (FMR, FNMR) in both fields. We found that having a low normalized
expected cost from the deployed recognition algorithms does not guarantee low waiting
times that may be experienced by travelers in the border inspection system.

The

travelers’ load imposes a very strong restriction over the results for any specific risk
level. Therefore, the correlation between the cost curves and the performance models
indeed guide the findings of optimal operating conditions.

5.2

Future Work
Our plans for the future work include the definition of confidence intervals for every

alert condition scenario in the cost curves in order to find the bounds within which the
risk (normalized cost) is expected to vary for every operating condition (FMR, FNMR).
Additionally, we plan to incorporate the assessment of statistical significance in operating
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ranges (misclassification costs and class probabilities) where cost curves from different
classification algorithms are taken into account.
Another important line of the research could be to analyze the performance and risk
of the border security systems by modeling the fusion of face and fingerprint matching
algorithms at the score-level and decision-level. This would create opportunities to
further analyze the operating points that would emerge as the most adequate compromise
from the risk analysis and performance models.
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Appendix A: Detailed Uses Cases and
Sequence Diagrams

In this appendix, we present in detail the assumed border inspection system configuration
by means of use cases (see Tables 15-18) and their corresponding sequence diagrams (see
Figures 40-44). The actors that interact with the system are: travelers and the interagency
border inspection system. Further, the critical processes that we studied are: traveler
examination, biographic checking, biometric verification and biometric identification.
Table 15 Traveler Examination expanded use case

Use Case

Traveler Examination

Actors

Traveler

Purpose

In this use case the traveler’s documents and biometrics traits are
verified against information of the traveler stored in system
databases in order to grant access to the country to rightful
travelers who does not present a risk for the country.

Cross-reference

Biographic checking, biometric verification

1. The traveler presents his/her 2. The primary officer scans the MRTD through the
MRTD (machine readable traveler MRTD reader.
document) to the primary officer 3. The data on the MRTD is retrieved and its
in the booth.

corresponding digital signature is confirmed by
employing the Public Key Certificate stored in the
Public Key Directory or in the MRTD itself.
4. Verification of the Public Key Certificate
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Authority, MRZ and face image is performed.
5. The system initiates the biographic checking use
case.
6. The system requests the live inkless acquisition
of traveler’s fingerprints and face image, see
biometric verification use case.
7. The primary officer grants the traveler access to
the country.
Alternate section

Line 2. If the MRTD is either damaged or its reader is not working properly, the officer
manually enters the information into the system and continues to perform the biographic
and biometric inspection.
Line 4. If any of the verifications fail, the primary officer stops the traveler’s primary
inspection process and sends the traveler to the second inspection.
Line 7. The primary officer is not convinced with the system’s results, so he sends the
traveler to further processing in the secondary inspection.

Table 16 Biographic Checking expanded use case

Use Case

Biographic Checking

Actors

Interagency Border Inspection System

Purpose

In this use case the traveler’s information is checked against
existing information of the traveler in the CCD system database
and the TNS in order to permit the entry of individuals who are
not suspect of having a threat to the country, who have abided the
terms of their admission to the country and who are not required
for criminal acts.

Cross-reference

Traveler Examination
1. The basic traveler’s information such as: name,
last-name, birth-date and MRTD number is sent to
both the Traveler’s Name Server (TNS) and the
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CCD.
2. Traveler’s information from current immigration
status and criminal violations are retrieved from the
TNS.
Picture and consular information related to visa
applications, approvals, refusals and the biometric
identifiers captured during the process of MRTD
issuance are retrieved from the CCD.
3. A consolidate information about the traveler is
displayed.

Table 17 Biometric Verification expanded use case

Use Case

Biometric Verification

Actors

Traveler, Border Inspection System

Purpose

In this use case the traveler’s biometrics traits are verified against
information of the traveler stored in system databases.

Cross-reference

Traveler Examination
1. The traveler’s live fingerprints (right slap, left
slap, and thumbs slap) are captured by the
fingerprint scanner and a face image is taken by a
digital camera.
2. The system checks the quality of the collected
biometric traits.
3. The collected biometric traits are matched
against the traveler’s biometric templates in the
Traveler Biometric System (TBS).
4. Matching scores for fingerprint and face are
generated.
5. The system answers that the traveler is who
claims to be.
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Alternate section

Line 2. If the quality of the collected biometric traits is poor, the system will request
again the acquisition of the biometric traits.
Line 5. When the system decides that the traveler is not who claims to be, the primary
officer sends him/her to the secondary inspection booth.
Table 18 Biometric Identification expanded use case

Use Case

Biometric Identification

Actors

Border Inspection System

Purpose

In this use case the traveler’s face image is compared against a
consolidated watchlist stored in system databases.

Cross-reference

Traveler Examination
1. The traveler’s face image taken by a digital
camera in the primary inspection booth is sent to
the TB DB by an inspector in the secondary
inspection.
2. The TB DB generates match scores after
comparing the traveler’s face image against the
entire consolidated watchlist.
3. The TB DB ranks the match scores and retrieves
the top 50 identities.
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Figure 44 Sequence Diagram for the traveler examination use case. Adapted from [4]
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Figure 45 Sequence Diagram for the Biographic Checking use case

Figure 46 Sequence Diagram for the Secondary Inspection in the traveler examination use case.
Adapted from [4]
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Figure 47 Sequence Diagram for the Biometric Verification Use Case
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Figure 48 Sequence Diagram for the Biometric Identification Use Case
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Appendix B: Performance Parameters

The assumed execution environment of the border inspection system is depicted
here. Resource demands within each step performance scenario that is translated to a
parameter in the LQN model are also presented. Table 19 and Table 20, present data
assumptions that are extended from technical reports of analogous systems
[4][27][28][29][58].

Table 21 to Table 24, present the estimated time of each

<<PAstep>> for the sequence diagrams based on the data assumptions and calculated
values.
Table 19 Hardware Platform Devices and Transfer Rates Specification. Adapted from [4][58]
POE
Workstation

CPU
Memory
Disk
Delay
Transfer
Time

Pentium
2.6 GHz
2 GB
6 ms
130 MB/s

Traveler
Name
Server
(TNS)

Consular
Consolidate
Database
(CCD)
Server

Traveler
Biometric
Server
(TBS)

5.93 ms

5.93 ms

5.93 ms

200
MB/s

200 MB/s

200 MB/s

MRTD
Reader

MRTD
Card

424 kb/s

848 kb/s

LAN

WAN

100
Mbits/s

16.6
Mbits/s

MRTD
Public
Certificate
KB
1.8

Machine
Readable
Zone
bytes
88

Table 20 Estimated Data Size. Adapted from [27][58]

Type
Size

Fingerprint
Scans (10
fingerprints)
KB
50

Face
Image
KB
20

Watchlist
(106 Face
images)
KB
2*107

Traveler
Name
Record
KB
5
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Consolidated
Consular
Record
KB
20

Picture
inside
MRTD
bytes
12704

MRTD
digital
signature
bytes
20

Table 21 Scenario Steps with Performance Annotations for the Sequence Diagram of the Traveler
Examination. Adapted from [4]

Scenario Step
beginPrimaryInspection

Meaning
Assumed time to generate a request for primary inspection.

{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0,’s’)}

reviewDocuments
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(20,’s’)}

processInspectionData
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(5,’s’)}

return inspectionResult
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(5,’s’)}

Assumed time used for interviewing/reviewing- documents a
traveler in the primary inspection.
Assumed time spent by the primary inspection officer to
decide whether the traveler can enter the country based on the
results from checks.
Assumed time to communicate the result of the inspection
process in the primary inspection.

biographic&biometricChecks
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)}

captureFingerprint

Assumed time used for setting the fingerprint scanner up.

{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)}

return fingerprintData
{PAdemand=(‘pred’,’mean’,(15,’s’)}

checkQuality

Calculated time used for capturing left slap, right slap and
thumbs slap of the traveler.
Assumed time used to check the quality of the biometric trait.

{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)}

capture faceImage

Assumed time used for setting the digital camera up.

{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)}

return faceImageData
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(5,’s’)}

send-store&matchBiometrics
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)
PAextOp=(‘pred’,’mean’,(0.0329,’s’)}

read-writeBiometricData
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)
PAextOp=(‘pred’,’mean’,(0.00637,’s’)}

Assumed time used for taking a traveler’s picture using a
digital camera
Calculated time used for transmitting the biometric data
collected from the traveler (fingerprint scans + face image) in
the POE Workstation to the TBS, through the WAN that
connect them.
0.0329 = 70KB/16.6 Megabits/s
Calculated time used for writing the biometric data collected
from the traveler (fingerprint scans + face image) to the TBS
disk, and to read a previously stored face image file (20KB)
from it.
0.00637= 5.93 ms + (90 KB/ 200MB/s)

return biometricMatchResult
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)}

processData(MRTDValidation,
biographicResult,
biometricVerificationResult)

Assumed time used for consolidating the results from the
MRTD validation, the biographic information and the
biometric verification result.

{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)}

return checksResult
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)}

scanMRTD
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(1,’s’)}

Assumed time for swiping the MRTD through the MRTD
reader by the primary inspection officer.
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Scenario Step
return MRTDData
{PAdemand=(‘pred’,’mean’,(X,’s’)
PAextOp=(‘pred’,’mean’,(Y,’s’)}

validateMRTD
{PAdemand=(‘pred’,’mean’,(X,’s’)}

Meaning
Calculate time used by the MRTD Reader to read the data
stored in the MRTD. The actual duration of the operation
depends on the size of the MRTD data, which leads to the
following alternatives:
X =15695.2 bytes/424 kilobits/s=0.2708s
X =12852 bytes/424 kilobits/s=0.2368s
Time used by the MRTD to transfer its data to the MRTD
reader. The actual duration of the operation depends on the
size of the MRTD data, which leads to the following
alternatives:
Y =15695.2 bytes/848 kilobits/s=0.1446s
Y =12852 bytes/848 kilobits/s=0.1184 s
Time used to transfer the MRTD data from the MRTD reader
to the POE Workstation through a 12 Mbits/s USB link. The
duration of the operation depends on the size of the MRTD
data:
X=15695.2 bytes/12 MB/s=0.0093s
X =12852 bytes/12 MB/s=0.0082s

getPKCertificate
{PAdemand=(‘pred’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)}

return PKCertificate
{PAdemand=(‘pred’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)
PAextOp=(‘pred’,’mean’,(Y,’s’)}

validate(MRTD_DS)
{PAdemand=(‘pred’,’mean’,(X,’s’)}

validate(CAPKCertificate)
{PAdemand=(‘pred’,’mean’,(0.0015,’s’)}

validate(MRZ_DS)
{PAdemand=(‘pred’,’mean’,(0.0009,’s’)}

Time used to read Public Key Certificates from the Disk of
the POE Workstation. The reading time depends on the
number of certificates to be read (one or two), which leads to
the next alternatives:
Y =6.5 ms + (1.8KB/ 130MB/s) =0.006513s
Y =6.5 ms + (3.6KB/ 130MB/s) =0.006517s
Time used to validate the authenticity of the digital signature
on the MRTD by computing a hash function (SHA-1) of the
MRTD data, and by verifying the authenticity of the digital
signature through the RSA algorithm using the Public Key of
the MRTD signer (2048 bits) [27]. The next alternatives
consider different MRTD sizes:
X=
t[SHA_1(14695.2bytes)]
+
t[RSA(2048bits)verify(20bytes)]=0.0091s
X=
t[SHA_1(12852bytes)]
+
t[RSA(2048bits)verify(20bytes)]=0.0091s
Time used to validate the authenticity of the digital signature
on the Public Key Certificate of the MRTD issuer by
computing a hash function (SHA-1) of the certificate data
itself, and by verifying the authenticity of its digital signature
through the RSA algorithm using the Public Key of the
Country CA (3072 bits) [27].
0.0015=t[SHA_1(1.8KB)]
+
t[RSA(3072bits)verify(20bytes)]=0.0015s
Time used to validate the authenticity of the MRZ within the
MRTD by computing a hash function (SHA-1) of the MRZ
data, and by verifying the authenticity of the digital signature
on the MRZ through the RSA with the Public Key of the
document signer (2048 bits) [27].
0.0009=t[SHA_1(88bytes)]
+
t[RSA(2048bits)verify(20bytes)]=0.0009s
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Scenario Step
validate(faceImage_DS)
{PAdemand=(‘pred’,’mean’,(0.0006,’s’)}

Meaning
Time used to validate the authenticity of the face image within
the MRTD by computing a hash function (SHA-1) of the
image data, and by verifying the authenticity of the digital
signature on the face image through the RSA with the Public
Key of the document signer (2048 bits) [27].
0.0006=t[SHA_1(12704bytes)]
+
t[RSA(2048bits)verify(20bytes)]=0.0006s

return MRTDValidation
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)}

findTravelerData
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)
PAextOp=(‘pred’,’mean’,(0.0118,’s’)}

Time used to exchange the TNS traveler’s biographic and
lookup information (5 KB) and his picture (20 KB).
25KB / 16.6 Megabits/s = 0.0118s

findName
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)}

getImmigrationStatus
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)}

getViolations
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)}

return consolidateInfo
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)
PAextOp=(‘pred’,’mean’,(0.00595,’s’)}

Time used to retrieve from the TNS disk the traveler’s
biographic and lookup data (5 KB):
5.93 ms + (5 KB / 200MB/s) = 0.00595s

findPicture
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)}

return picture
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)
PAextOp=(‘pred’,’mean’,(0.006,’s’)}

Time used to retrieve from the CCD server disk the traveler’s
picture:
5.93 ms + (20KB /200MB/s) = 0.006s

return consolidateInfo, picture
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)}

beginSecondaryInspection
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0,’s’)}

identifyTraveler
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(5,’s’)
PAextOp=(‘pred’,’mean’,(0.0094,’s’)}

compareWatchlist
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(5,’s’)
PAextOp=(‘pred’,’mean’,(97.66218,’s’)}

Time used by the secondary inspection officer to start an
identification process.
Time used to send a face image of the traveler to the TBS.
20KB/16.6Megabits/s=0.0094s
5 s is the time used by the TBS to match the traveler’s face
image with the set of 106 face images in the biometric
watchlist.
Time used by the TBS disk to read the set of 106 face image
templates in the biometric watchlist. The total time required to
perform the computation depends on the size of the watchlist.
5.93 ms + (2×107 KB /200MB/s) = 97.66218s

rankIdentities
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)}

Return identities
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)}

reviewDocs
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(300,’s’)}

processInspectionData
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(5,’s’)}

Time used by the secondary inspection officer to thoroughly
review the traveler’s documents and personal effects.
Time used by the secondary inspection officer to decide if
authorizing the traveler to enter the country based on the
results from checks.
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Scenario Step
return inspectionResult
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(2,’s’)}

Meaning
Time used by the secondary inspection officer to
communicate to the traveler the result of the inspection
process.

Table 22 Scenario Steps with Performance Annotations for the Sequence Diagram of the Biographic
Checking

findTravelerData
findName
getImmigrationStatus
getViolations
return consolidateInfo
findPicture
return picture
return consolidateInfo, picture

{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0,’s’)}
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)
PAextOp=(‘pred’,’mean’,(0.006,’s’)}
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)}
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)}
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)}
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)
PAextOp=(‘pred’,’mean’,(0.0062,’s’)}
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)}
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)}

Table 23 Scenario Steps with Performance Annotations for the Sequence Diagram of the Biometric
Verification

captureFingerprint
return fingerprintData
checkQuality
capture faceImage
return faceImageData
store&matchBiometrics
MatchFingerPrint
MatchFace
Verification
return biometricVerificationDecision

{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)}
{PAdemand=(‘pred’,’mean’,(15,’s’)}
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)}
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)}
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(5,’s’)}
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0,’s’)}
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)}
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.05,’s’)}
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.5,’s’)}
{PAdemand=(‘asmd’,’mean’,(0.005,’s’)}

Table 24 Scenario Steps with Performance Annotations for the Sequence Diagram of the Biometric
Identification

identifyBiometrics
identifyTraveler
compareWatchlist
rankIdentities
return identities
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